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I. INTRODUCTION 
Like Beelzebub, “sentencing entrapment” has many names.  Some 
call it “sentencing manipulation,” the government’s artful maneuvers to 
enhance a suspect’s crime.2  Some call it “sentencing gerrymandering”, the 
government’s maneuvers to enhance a suspect’s sentence.3  Some courts 
call it “imperfect entrapment,” government inducement which impairs the 
suspect’s intent.4  Michigan courts call it “sentencing escalation,” 
government action which guides the suspect towards additional crimes.5  In 
 
 2. See United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 158 
(1996) (noting that “[s]entencing manipulation occurs when the government engages in improper 
conduct that has the effect of increasing a defendant’s sentence.”). 
 3. See United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 194 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that “[m]uch has 
been written about . . . opportunities that the sentencing guidelines pose for prosecutors to 
gerrymander the district courts’ sentencing options and thus, defendants’ sentences.”); see also 
United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that “it was ‘not at all fortuitous 
that the agent arrested [the defendant] only after he had arranged enough successive buys to reach 
the magic number (referring to 50 grams, the quantity that triggers the application of the 10-year 
mandatory minimum sentence.’”) (quoting United States v. Barth, 788 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D. 
Minn. 1992)). 
 4. See United States v. Dickey, 924 F.2d 836, 839 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 383 
(1991) (holding that the agent’s action did not amount to imperfect entrapment). 
 5. See People v. Claypool, 684 N.W.2d 278, 280 (Mich. 2004) (stating that “if it can be 
objectively and verifiably shown that police conduct or some other precipitating cause altered a 
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the end, “sentencing entrapment” is a subset of the greater entrapment 
defense where the government creates or induces a far greater crime than 
the suspect originally intends.6  Once a reticent suspect agrees to commit a 
greater crime, then the suspect’s sentence, which is frequently mandatory, 
is increased dramatically.7  The government’s primary motivation is to 
increase their bargaining power over the suspect’s charges and sentence.8   
There are several examples of sentencing entrapment.  A suspect sells 
powder cocaine to an undercover agent, but the undercover agent demands 
repeatedly that the reticent suspect “cook” the cocaine into “crack,” which 
may carry a significantly higher punishment.9  A person buys handguns 
from an undercover agent, but the agent insists on selling machine guns to 
the reluctant suspect at an incredibly low discounted price, thereby adding 
25 years to the suspect’s sentence.10  A suspect sells drugs, but the agent 
convinces the unwary suspect to sell the drugs near a school building, 
where the proximity of the school building invokes a mandatory sentence 
enhancement.11  A person agrees to possess a bundle of drugs, but the 
 
defendant’s intent, that altered intent can be considered by the sentencing judge as a ground for a 
downward sentence departure”). 
 6. See Robert S. Johnson, The Ills of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Search for a 
Cure: Using Sentence Entrapment to Combat Governmental Manipulation of Sentencing, 49 VAND. 
L. REV. 197, 198, 215 (1996). 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1506 (8th Cir. 1996) (increasing 
defendant’s sentence by 25 years for briefly possessing an unloaded machine gun), abrogated by 
Watson v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 579 (2007). In Watson, the Supreme Court held that trading 
drugs for a firearm does not constitute “use” of that firearm under a statute setting mandatory 
minimum sentences for use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime.  Watson, 128 S. Ct. at 586.  
In so holding, the Supreme Court abrogated Federal Appellate Court holdings to the contrary, 
including Cannon.  Id. 
 8. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 675 (3rd ed. 2005) 
(noting some claim that “prosecutors typically divide a criminal transaction into as many offenses as 
they can and charge them all”). 
 9. See United States v. Miller, 71 F.3d 813, 815 (11th Cir. 1996).  The crack-powder cocaine 
bifurcation has been diminished with a recent Supreme Court decision that allows a judge the discretion 
to take the discrepancy into consideration, but the statute still allows a greater sentence for crack cocaine.  
See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 572 (2007) (holding that federal sentencing judges 
are not bound by the United States Sentencing Guidelines’ 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio); see also 
Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 595 (2007) (holding that federal sentencing judges are not 
required to find “extraordinary circumstances” before significantly deviating from the guidelines 
range). 
 10. See Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1500-501, 1506, abrogated by Watson v. United States 128 S. Ct 
579 (2007).  For an explanation of the abrogation of Cannon, see supra note 7. 
 11. See United States v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 39, 44-45 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the 
school-zone statute, 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), which doubles the punishment if drugs are sold within one 
thousand feet of a school, is constitutional, regardless of whether the drug transaction affects the 
children); see also United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d 66, 69 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the school 
zone statute does not require the defendant to have knowledge that a school building exists one 
thousand feet from the drug transaction); see generally, William G. Phelps, Validity and 
3
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undercover agent places more drugs in the bundle than the initial 
agreement.12  The suspect’s ignorance of the specific amount is immaterial 
and the suspect is sentenced based on the higher amount of drugs.13   
There is, admittedly, little sympathy for a criminal suspect who is 
willing to commit a crime, and with some inducement, is willing to commit 
an even greater crime.  Such a suspect has illustrated his or her 
susceptibility and has established empirical proof of dangerousness.  On 
the other hand, undercover agents and undercover informants are 
frequently motivated by financial rewards, by job promotions, by 
commissions, by reduced charges, by reduced sentences, by contingent 
fees, and by favorable treatment to corral the suspect(s) into a higher grade 
of offense(s).14  One of the most indelible characteristics of many 
prosecutors’ offices is the basic drive for excessive charges, in part to 
stimulate guilty pleas.15  The pay-off in “shock and awe” headlines alone is 
worth re-election.16 
This article examines how sentencing enhancement schemes play 
into undercover operations and manipulation ploys.  This article reviews 
entrapment doctrines, starting with the common law principles of 
unclean hands and estoppel, to settled principles of objective and 
subjective entrapment.  Through principles of conspiracy, the 
 
Construction of 21 U.S.C. § 860 Enhancing Penalty for Drug Distribution if Offense Occurs within 
1,000 Feet of School, College, or University, 108 A.L.R. Fed. 783.  In small towns, drug free zones 
cover literally half the town.  See NATE BLAKESLEE, TULIA: RACE, COCAINE, AND CORRUPTION IN 
A SMALL TEXAS TOWN 80 (2005) (noting that the town of Tulia, Texas, is an example of this 
situation). 
 12. United States v. Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d 368, 369 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 13. In United States v. Ekwunoh, for instance, the court concluded that a person’s lack of 
knowledge regarding the amount of drugs she possessed was insignificant at sentencing.  Id. at 370.  
Caroline Ekwunoh pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after accepting an attaché 
case containing one thousand thirteen grams of heroin from an undercover agent.  Id. at 369.  The Court 
of Appeals held that Ms. Ekwunoh’s knowledge was satisfied because she knew she possessed illegal 
drug contraband.  Id. at 370.  The amount, given the circumstances, was foreseeable, said the court.  Id.  
“The defendant may be sentenced only for the quantity of drugs [s]he knew or should reasonably have 
foreseen that [s]he possessed.”  Id. 
 14. See George E. Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEX. L. REV. 
203, 286-91 (1975); see also Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies 
by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 805-15 (1997) (assessing investigative lies in undercover work, 
searches and seizures, and interrogation). 
 15. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 674-75. 
 16. M. Daniel Gibbard, 5-Year Drug Sting Yields 15 Arrests in Evanston: Disciples’ Brass 
Quietly Removed, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21, 2004; Ralph Blumenthal, A Zealous Prosecutor of Drug 
Criminals Becomes One Himself, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at A14 (noting how a self-righteous 
law and order prosecutor was stealing drugs from the property room – discovered through 
undercover investigation). 
4
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undercover operation ensnares perpetrators who intend factually 
impossible crimes, as long as an overt step is taken.   
Sentencing enhancement crimes, induced by government agents, 
must be proven before a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  A reciprocal 
corollary is that the accused must be able to defend enhancement 
accusations through defenses such as sentencing manipulation and 
sentencing entrapment.  Such manipulation has encouraged a venal war 
on the underclass.  Mass arrests by rogue undercover agents have 
accounted for wrongful convictions and loss of society.  Civil rights law 
suits and undercover standards belatedly redress the issues.  The good 
and evil characters become indistinguishable.         
Part II examines Common Law Entrapment through the equitable 
principles of Estoppel and Unclean Hands.  Entrapment is a fundamental 
defense designed to shield the integrity of the courts and fulfill a fiduciary 
obligation to steer citizens from crime.  Part III reviews Undercover 
Operations and current entrapment doctrine.  Undercover operations 
frequently promote excessive inducements. 
Part IV examines sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation 
doctrines as a cognizable defense to sentencing enhancement charges.17  
Sentencing enhancement factors, frequently mandatory, are facts related to 
the offense which may increase a person’s sentence.18  Although the 
prosecutor has jurisdiction to determine the breadth of investigation, the 
courts may pierce the prosecutorial veil of discretion.19  Part V reviews the 
overlay of sentencing law and enhancement offenses and procedural 
tactics.  The prosecutor’s burden to prove sentence enhancement factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury obliges a necessary corollary that 
the accused has an independent Sixth Amendment right to present defenses 
to the enhancement factors.20  Formal sentencing entrapment defenses, 
however, are frequently rejected.21   
 
 17. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468-69 (2000) (examining racial hatred 
sentencing enhancement statute). 
 18. Id. at 494-95. 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Lora, 129 F. Supp. 2d 77, 89-90 (D. Mass. 2001) (discussing 
sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation). 
 20. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1982).  See also Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 524 (2006) (recognizing that 
defendants have the right to present sentence defenses which explain how, but not whether, the 
crime occurred in capital death penalty cases).  
 21. United States v. Miller, 71 F.3d 813 (11th Cir. 1996).  In Miller, where the accused who sold 
powder cocaine was predisposed to sell crack, the court held that sentencing entrapment is a defunct 
doctrine and impermissible in the 11th Circuit.  Id. at 818.  In addition, the defense theory of partial 
entrapment is not permissible either.  Id.  A number of federal courts do not recognize a partial 
entrapment defense.  In the federal arena, the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits accept the 
5
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Part VI considers entrapment through the lenses of conspiracy and 
governmental influences on the suspect’s mens rea.  Conspiracy 
prosecutions for imaginary crimes are abundant, where impossibility is no 
defense.  Internet pornography and fantasy speech are convenient targets 
for high-tech sting operations.  Part VII unravels Corruption of Police 
forces and disreputable undercover operations which have lead to the faulty 
incarceration of hundreds of minorities.  Tulia, Texas is a model example 
of jurisprudential corruption invoking Civil Rights remedies, 
Reconciliation Committees, statutory changes, and Standards for 
Undercover Operations.  The Article concludes with the overlay of 
entrapment and manipulation on our body politic.   
II. COMMON LAW ENTRAPMENT: PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 
A. Entrapment by Estoppel 
Entrapment presents the equitable, common law principles of 
estoppel,22 clean hands, and consent.23  As estoppel, a party who misleads 
another is precluded from asserting a position at variance with the 
appearance he or she has created.24  The estoppel rule seeks to prevent one 
party from gaining advantage over another party by misleading conduct.25  
The estoppel rule is a basic due process guarantee and bars the entire cause 
of action. 26  
 
doctrine of sentencing entrapment, which focuses on the defendant's predisposition.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1101 (8th Cir. 2000) (accepting doctrine as defense; proper 
analysis focuses on defendant's predisposition).  They accept sentencing entrapment, but few courts 
find it under the facts.  Typically, there are other facts indicative of the accused's willingness to 
engage in a higher crime.  See, e.g., United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 962-63, 966 (10th Cir. 
1996) (finding sufficient evidence of defendant’s engagement in large drug deals to overcome his 
argument of sentencing entrapment or manipulation). 
 22. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 445 (1932). (stating that “[n]either courts of 
equity nor those administering legal remedies tolerate the use of their process to consummate a 
wrong.”  Id. at 455 (Roberts, J., concurring).  
 23. Topolewski v. State, 109 N.W. 1037, 1039, 1040-41 (Wis. 1906); see also Johnson, supra 
note 6. 
 24. DAN DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 84 (2d ed. 1993). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See generally Johnson, supra note 6; State v. Ragan, 288 P. 218, 219-20 (Wash. 1930) 
(holding evidence not to show entrapment, but merely furnishing an opportunity to commit 
bootlegging offense in illicit traffic in intoxicating liquor); City of Seattle v. Gleiser, 189 P.2d 967, 
967, 971-72 (Wash. 1948) (affording opportunity to aid and abet prostitution is not entrapment). 
6
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A variation of the estoppel claim is the mistake of law doctrine of 
reliance.27  A person may raise a mistake of law defense, if actions were 
induced by government solicitation or interpretation.28  In Raley v. Ohio,29 
for instance, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s conviction for 
refusing to answer questions about Communist activities before a State 
Commission violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment 
because defendants were entrapped by being assured that the exercise of 
the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination would shield 
them from liability.30  Under mistake of law principles, a person’s crime 
is excused if that person reasonably relied on an official inducement or 
official interpretation.31  The entrapment by estoppel defense similarly 
applies where a person acts on reasonable governmental assurances or 
inducements that the actions are proper.32  Undercover operations, 
however, fall short of estoppel unless the implicit conduct of the 
undercover operative is so brazen as to create the crime.33  If so, the 
government has forfeited its right to prosecute.34    
B. Entrapment as Unclean Hands 
Entrapment, as an equitable defense, also invokes the clean hands 
doctrine.  The maxim, “one who comes into equity must come with clean 
hands” applies when the plaintiff has dirtied his or her hands in initiating 
 
 27. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 168 (discussing Reasonable-Reliance Doctrine 
(entrapment by estoppel)). 
 28. Id. at 169. 
 29. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 423 (1959). 
 30. Id. at 441. 
 31. Id. at 425-26. 
 32. United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Smith, 
940 F.2d 710, 714 (1st Cir. 1991)).  In California, the entrapment by estoppel defense allows private 
citizens to contest criminal charges because they had been told by the authorities in advance they 
could not be prosecuted for certain acts.  People v. Chacon, 150 P.3d 755, 761-62 (Cal. 2007).  This 
is a type of Mistake of Law defense.  Interestingly enough, the entrapment by estoppel defense is 
not available to a public official who acts in reliance upon advice provided by a government lawyer 
who serves at his or her pleasure.  Id. at 763.  The Court explains that, “[i]f permitted to rely on the 
defense of entrapment by estoppel, such an official could insulate herself from prosecution by 
influencing an appointee to provide the advice she seeks.”  Id.  
 33. U.S. v. Healy, 202 F. 349, 349 (D. Mont. 1913) (stating that “[d]ecoys are permissible to 
entrap criminals, but not to create them . . . Where a statute . . . makes an act a crime regardless of 
the actor's intent or knowledge, ignorance of fact is no excuse if the act be done voluntarily; but 
when done upon solicitation by the government's instrument to that end ignorance of fact stamps the 
act as involuntary, and . . . estopps the government from a conviction.”); See also Johnson, supra 
note 6. 
 34. Healy, 202 F. at 349; see also Johnson, supra note 6. 
7
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the prosecution.35  The courts’ jurisdictional moral standing is jeopardized 
if a court aids a prosecution initiated from corrupt practices.  “It is the 
province of the court and of the court alone to protect itself and the 
government from such prostitution of the criminal law.”36 
Early American cases concerning entrapment distinguished active 
versus passive participation as the determining line whether the 
government created the criminal intent.37  These cases concerned the 
distribution of intoxicating liquors, pornography, and theft – similar to 
issues of today.38  Government over-reaching violates the equitable due 
process principles, exemplified in such cases as United States v. 
Jacobson,39 where the government so sullied itself as a pornographic agent 
as to demean the entire prosecution with unclean hands.40  
C. Entrapment as Consent 
Entrapment principles, argued as consent, extend to those 
prosecutions which invite crimes and lure potential offenders in order to 
prosecute tempted individuals.41  In Topolewski v. State,42 for instance, the 
manager of a meat packing company intentionally left meat on the loading 
platform as bait.43  The employees encouraged the suspect to take the meat 
and they arranged a wagon for the suspect’s escape.44  The court found 
such actions amounted to entrapment and consent.45  Similarly, equitable 
entrapment principles of consent applied to slaves in early America, when 
slaves were induced by their owners to sell and buy liquor for the owners, 
who belatedly claimed the slaves committed theft.46   
 
 35. See Craig E. Davis, Equity: Clean Hands Doctrine: Tradename Infringement: Relief 
Awarded on Condition That Complainant Cleanse His Hands, 43 MICH. L. REV. 409, 409 (1944). 
 36. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932). 
 37. Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1895) (concerning pornography sent 
through the mails, where the Court recognized that the participation of the detectives was passive 
investigation). 
 38. See generally Johnson, supra note 6. 
 39. United States v. Jacobson, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992). 
 40. Id.  In Jacobson, the government created several fictitious pornographic sites and through 
the years lured a farmer to finally subscribe to Bare Boys magazine.  Id. at 542-43. 
 41. See Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment 
Defense, 73 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1014 (1987). 
 42. Topolewski v. State, 109 N.W. 1037, 1039 (Wis. 1906). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. (stating that “the purpose on the part of the latter being to entrap and bring to justice 
one thought to be disposed to commit the offense of larceny . . . ”).  
 46. State v. Geze, 1853 WL 4169 at *1 (La. 1853) (holding it constitutes entrapment to sell 
liquor to a slave). 
8
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Early entrapment principles sought to remedy manipulations which 
undermined the “social contract” established between the government and 
its people to encourage social benefits, not create societal harms.47  “The 
first duties of the officers of the law are to prevent, not to punish crime.  
It is not their duty to incite to and create crime for the sole purpose of 
prosecuting and punishing it.”48  If a crime originated in the mind of the 
government and the defendant was lured into the criminal act, then no 
prosecution was valid.49  Undercover investigations are necessary tools to 
unravel surreptitious and intricate crimes.  A certain leeway is granted 
where the government must infiltrate the criminal mind and expose those 
bent on clandestine and specialized offenses.50  “Artifice and stratagem 
may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises.”51  “You 
want to catch the lion, first you tether the goat.”52 
III.  UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS AND CURRENT ENTRAPMENT DOCTRINE 
Undercover operations, if the truth be told, are closely aligned with 
conspiracy, manipulation, intent, privacy intrusions, wiretapping, and, of 
course, spying.53  Undercover investigations are intricately immersed with 
manipulative agents, who initiate, coax, sway, and befriend those 
"predisposed" to commit criminal offenses.  On one hand, undercover 
investigations are solid, empirical proof of present and future 
dangerousness.  Through the operation, the police can prove the suspect’s 
intent to commit the crime.54  The typical detective stands after-the-fact, 
too late to prevent the crime.  Undercover operations, however, are 
empirical pre-crime investigations, where the undercover agent conspires 
with the suspect, only to arrest the suspect(s) at some inchoate or cultivated 
stage.   
 
 47. Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35, 38 (1921). 
 48. Id. (holding that defendant’s prosecution for the sale of morphine amounted to 
entrapment). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.  435, 441 (1932). 
 51. Id. 
 52. LECARRE, supra note 1, at 302 (providing a fictional account of a prolonged pursuit by 
Israeli intelligence agents to capture a deceptive Palestinian terrorist leader). 
 53. See generally CHARLES BOWDEN, A SHADOW IN THE CITY, CONFESSIONS OF AN 
UNDERCOVER DRUG WARRIOR (2005) (providing a literary account of an undercover drug agent, 
who orchestrates “take downs” with imagination and obsessive precision.  Years have eroded the 
certainty about the meaning of his work, yet the “bust goes down” in a clatter of broken lives). 
 54. Every crime must have a mens rea, intent component, and actus reus, voluntary act 
component.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 115. 
9
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Undercover investigations are embedded in our criminal and literary 
folklore.55  There are intricate, sophisticated, and surreptitious crimes that 
only the deceptive undercover police informant can unravel.  The 
informant may be a police agent with a dramatic skill or an informant who 
fears criminal prosecution.56  Police officials, behind the scenes, direct the 
agent or informant on the objectives and progress of the operation.57  In 
theory, the undercover operation is a conspiratorial action.  In deed, the 
undercover operation is the lie that tells the truth.58   
When the undercover operation promotes excessive inducements on 
reluctant suspects, therein lies the defense of entrapment.59  The 
government, through its manipulative acts, may create the crime or prey 
upon natural human weaknesses.60  Depending on a person's status, needs, 
addictions, or desires, "the only salient question is whether a person's price 
has been met" to accommodate his or her weakness, be it money, sex, 
drugs, or any of the deadly sins.61 
As previously stated, the entrapment doctrine is a product of equitable 
common law principles.  It is also a judicial creation through the court’s 
supervisory role to deter governmental excessiveness, to constrain 
outrageous police behavior, and to promote judicial integrity.62  “Congress 
could not have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has 
 
 55. See, e.g., BOWDEN, supra note 53. 
 56. See Slobogin, supra note 14, at 805-08 (assessing investigative lies in undercover work, 
searches and seizures, and interrogation). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 776. 
 59. See State v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035, 1048-49 (Wash. 1996); United States v. Cuervelo, 949 
F.2d 559, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1991).  Sex is an attractive inducement.  In Lively, the court held that a 
government agent took advantage of a vulnerable single mother who attended Alcoholics 
Anonymous by befriending her and beginning a sexual relationship in order to involve her in drug 
activities.  Lively, 921 P.2d at 1048-49.  See also Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 568-69 (remanding case to 
consider whether the government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its investigatory 
arsenal). 
 60. See Lively, 921 P.2d at 1048-49; Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 568-69. 
 61. Ronald J. Allen, Melissa Luttrell, & Anne Kreeger, Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 407, 413 (1999) (stating that “[t]he only salient question is whether a person’s 
price has been met, not whether he has one, since by hypothesis everyone but the saintly does . . . 
[T]he person who does not take the bait almost surely would take a higher, even if greatly higher, 
bait.  The failure to take this one is evidence of his price, but not of predisposition.”); see also Louis 
Michael Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1981 SUP. CT. 
REV. 111, 146 (1981).  The seven deadly sins are “pride, covetousness, lust, anger, gluttony, envy, and 
sloth.”  Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deadly%20 
sin. 
 62. Lively, 921 P.2d at 1044-45; see also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932), 
where Justice Roberts, concurring, invoked the court’s supervisory role and identified entrapment as a 
legitimate defense in order to protect “the purity of [the court’s] own temple . . . ” 
10
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committed all the elements of a proscribed offense but was induced to 
commit them by the government.”63  
In determining entrapment, the courts consider (1) whether the police 
instigated the crime or merely infiltrated an ongoing criminal activity, (2) 
whether the undercover agent was a passive or active accomplice in the 
criminal offense, (3) whether the undercover informant overcame 
defendant’s reluctance through pleas of sympathy, promises of excessive 
profits, or persistent solicitations, and (4) whether the overall police 
conduct was “repugnant to a sense of justice.”64   Some states have adopted 
statutory entrapment defenses.65  The Washington legislature, for 
instance, provides: 
   “(1)  In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that: 
    (a) The criminal design originated in the mind of law enforcement 
officials, or any person acting under their direction, and 
   (b) The actor was lured or induced to commit a crime which the 
actor had not otherwise intended to commit. 
  
   (2)  The defense of entrapment is not established by a showing 
only that law enforcement officials merely afforded the actor an 
opportunity to commit a crime.”66 
Current entrapment law remains an equitable remedy, as the case is 
dismissed because the investigatory agency has initiated the prosecution 
with Unclean Hands.  The entrapment defense compares whose hands are 
most dirty: the predisposed suspect or the predetermined government.     
A. The Subjective Test of Entrapment – Predisposition of the Suspect  
The entrapment defense causes weak people to make strong excuses.  
In the majority of jurisdictions, entrapment is governed by the subjective 
test, which focuses on whether a person is "predisposed" to commit the 
criminal transaction.67  If a person is predisposed, or inclined, to commit 
the criminal transaction, then the police inducement or offer is acceptable.68  
Predisposition is quite informal and may be based on suspicion, hearsay, 
 
 63. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973); see generally Anthony M. Dillof, 
Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 859 (2004). 
 64. Lively, 921 P.2d at 1046. 
 65. Id. at 1040-41.  See also Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.16.070 (West 1975). 
 66. RCW 9A.16.070. 
 67. See, e.g., Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); 
Russell, 411 U.S. at 435-36 (being the trifecta of Supreme Court cases affirming the subjective test). 
 68. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436. 
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rumor, reputation, prior record, or the suspect’s eagerness to commit the 
offense.69  To determine entrapment, a vague line is drawn separating the 
unwary innocent person from the unwary criminal.70  Frequently, sting 
operations for prostitution, drugs, theft, and other vices ignore labels of 
innocence and ensnare all who take the bait.71      
The use of character evidence to prove predisposition burdens those 
with prior criminal records, and those with addictions, and those who are 
poor.72  In the eyes of some, this burden is deserved considering that 
criminal behavior is frequently repeated.  In the eyes of others, it creates 
an uneasy, self-fulfilling prophecy.  It is easy to interweave the 
extrasensory delights of addictive narcotics into the fabric of an ongoing 
crime.  While addicted persons would certainly be predisposed to sell more 
drugs, there is something unfathomable for the police to prey on these 
weaknesses in order to sentence people to higher terms.73  Indigent persons 
are generally more desperate, with emotional, social, and economic 
crises that make them easy prey to alluring temptations.74  
There is no probable cause hearing to determine whether the suspect 
is predisposed.75  The investigation proceeds on a loose suspicion that a 
certain person is, or certain persons are, engaged in criminal activity.  The 
police cannot prove it, so they arrange an undercover operative to interact 
with the suspect(s).76  
Several scholars have unsuccessfully appealed for a reasonable 
suspicion test before an undercover investigation is undertaken.77  An 
undercover investigation intrudes on privacy issues, self-incrimination 
concerns, and the entire layer of personal liberties.78  The courts have 
uniformly ruled, however, that a probable cause hearing is unnecessary 
 
 69. United States v. Thomas, 134 F.3d 975, 979-80 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the accused 
may rebut bad reputation evidence with evidence of prior good acts, or prior clean record).  See also 
Sykes v. State, 739 So. 2d 641, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that evidence that 
defendant lacked a prior criminal history was relevant to rebut predisposition). 
 70. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372. 
 71. See, e.g., Maura F. J. Whelan, Lead Us Not Into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal 
to Replace the Entrapment Defense with a Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 
1193, 1211 (1985). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1211-12. 
 74. Id. at 1211. 
 75. Id. at 1216-17; see also William C. Sherrill, Note, The Defense of Entrapment: A Plea for 
Constitutional Standards, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 63, 80-83 (1967) (recommending a test requiring 
probable cause prior to solicitation and reasonableness in execution). 
 76. See Dix, supra note 14, at 216.  
 77. See, e.g., Sherrill, supra note 75, at 80-83 (recommending a test requiring a probable 
cause hearing). 
 78. Id. at 68. 
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as the investigation is generally the province of the prosecution under 
the Separation of Powers doctrine.79   
Due to the inherent intrusiveness of undercover operations and 
electronic monitoring, some courts are toughening the standards to 
require some measure of probable cause.80  The West Virginia Supreme 
Court, for instance, held that law enforcement officers must obtain a 
warrant before equipping an informer with surveillance devices inside a 
suspect’s home.81  The Court recognized that there is a significant 
difference in the expectation of privacy in one’s home versus outside the 
home.82   
Under the subjective test, the jury determines whether the suspect had 
the initial intent to commit the criminal offense.83  There are several 
famous jury acquittals applying the subjective test of entrapment.  John 
Delorean, a former General Motors Executive, started his new auto 
company, strikingly called The Delorean, but ran into financial difficulty.84  
A disgruntled employee whispered to the feds that Delorean was financing 
his company through illicit drug transactions.85  The government engaged 
in a prolonged undercover operation steering Delorean into financing his 
operation from corrupt Middle Eastern financiers.86  The undercover 
 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Allibhai, 939 F.2d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting even a 
requirement that government agents must have reasonable suspicion that a person is engaged in 
illegality before targeting him in a sting operation). 
 80. See, e.g., State v. Mullens, 650 S.E.2d 169, 190 (W. Va. 2007). 
 81. Id.   
 82. Id. This ruling is contrary to the prevailing federal standard enunciated in United States v. 
White, where the federal government does not need a warrant for in-house participant monitoring.  
401 U.S. 745, 754 (1971). 
 83. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 323, 424, 436 (1973) (concerning entrapment where a 
government undercover agent supplied the defendant with the necessary ingredients to make 
methamphetamine).  The courts typically instruct the jury on entrapment as follows:  
If the defendant was entrapped he [or she] must be found not guilty.  The government 
has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not 
entrapped.  If the defendant before contact with law-enforcement officers or their agents 
did not have any intent or disposition to commit the crime charged and was induced or 
persuaded by law-enforcement officers o[r] their agents to commit that crime, then he [or 
she] was entrapped.  On the other hand, if the defendant before contact with law-
enforcement officers or their agents did have an intent or disposition to commit the crime 
charged, then he [or she] was not entrapped even though law-enforcement officers or 
their agents provided a favorable opportunity to commit the crime or made committing 
the crime easier or even participated in acts essential to the crime. 
Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 547, footnote 1. 
 84. Whelan, supra note 71, at 1198.  The Delorean is a gull-winged car made famous in the 
movie trilogy of BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal Pictures 1985, 1989, 1990), starring Michael J. Fox. 
 85. Whelan, supra note 71, at 1198. 
 86. Id. 
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agents convinced DeLorean to sign over the entire voting stock of his 
fledgling company to federal agents posing as drug dealers in order for 
Delorean to save his company.87  The Detroit jury found that Delorean 
was not predisposed and the government preyed on his need to keep the 
company afloat.88   
B. The Objective Test – Outrageous Conduct by the Government 
A minority of jurisdictions assess entrapment under the objective test, 
which focuses on whether the government’s outrageous behavior induced 
the suspect to commit the crime.89  In the case of People v. Turner,90 for 
instance, the police repeatedly badgered Turner to sell heroin.91  The police 
investigator, who befriended defendant Turner, pretended to be addicted 
and begged for help.92  The investigator convinced Turner to travel long 
distances to buy heroin for his girlfriend.93  The Michigan Supreme Court 
applied the objective test and found the government’s conduct in coaxing a 
reluctant defendant to travel long distances and in preying on his friendship 
and drug weakness was outrageous police conduct.94 
Jacobson,95 decided on due process grounds, illustrates a case of 
outrageous government behavior.  Here, the federal government, under 
several pseudonyms, engaged in a long campaign to steer a former veteran 
turned farmer into soliciting pornographic boy magazines.96 
The subjective test and the objective test of entrapment consider 
similar factors, such as the accused’s prior criminal record, the accused’s 
reputation, whether the undercover agent repeatedly badgered the accused 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1199. 
 89. According to Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Sherman v. United States, “the 
crucial question . . . is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below 
standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power.”  
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J. concurring).  The Courts of Alaska, in Grossman v. State, 
457 P.2d 226, 230 (Alaska 1969), Michigan, in People v. Turner, 210 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Mich. 
1973), and Iowa, in State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa 1974) have adopted the objective 
test.  Hawaii, North Dakota, and New Hampshire have adopted the objective test by statute.  See 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § (1972)702-237; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. 
§ 626:5 (1974). 
 90. 210 N.W. 2d. 336 (Mich. 1973).  
 91. Id. at 12. 
 92. Id. at 12-13. 
 93. Id. at 13. 
 94. Id. at 22-23. With a reluctant defendant, the police should prevent the commission of the 
offense and elevate the criminal, rather than tend to further debase him.  Id. at 16 (citing People v. 
Sinclair, 194 N.W.2d 878, 888 (Mich. 1972)). 
 95. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 540 (1992). 
 96. Id. at 542-43. 
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to participate in the criminal transaction, whether there were 
disproportionate inducements like extreme monetary discounts, and 
whether the accused had an opportunity to withdraw from the illegal 
transaction.97  The subjective test emphasizes the defendant’s 
predisposition to commit the crime, which is decided by a jury.  The 
objective test emphasizes the police conduct and is decided by the trial 
judge at a pre-trial hearing.  If the judge decides there is no entrapment, 
then the defendant cannot raise the entrapment issue at trial.98  This is 
similar to a Fourth Amendment claim: if the evidence is suppressed as an 
unconstitutional search, the jury never hears it.99  The subjective and 
objective tests frequently overlap and lead to the same conclusion.100  
Occasionally, the two tests may lead to different conclusions.101  In United 
States v. Searcy,102 for instance, the court held that the sale and possession 
of crack cocaine was not entrapment under the objective, outrageous 
conduct test, but it was entrapment under the subjective, predisposition test 
because the accused was not predisposed.103   
C. A Hybrid Test 
Several states employ a hybrid test, a combination of the subjective 
and objective tests, where the judge initially adjudicates the claim under the 
objective test at a pretrial hearing and, if the entrapment defense fails at this 
stage, the jury is then given the opportunity at trial to adjudicate the claim 
under the subjective test.104  This is similar to a Fifth Amendment 
confession issue.  If a court rules that a confession is proper in a pretrial 
hearing, the defense can still argue the confession was involuntary to the 
jury. 
 
 97. United States v. Miller, 71 F.3d 813, 816 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Ventura, 936 
F.2d 1228, 1231, 1232 (11th Cir. 1991)).  See also United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1101 (8th Cir. 
2000) (holding that crack cocaine was not entrapment under the objective, outrageous conduct test, but it 
was entrapment under the subjective, predisposition test). 
 98. This is similar to a search and seizure issue, which is raised in pre-trial proceedings.  
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).  If a search violation is found, the evidence is 
suppressed at trial.  Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Allen et. al., supra note 61 at 410-13 (discussing the nonexistent practical distinctions 
between the subjective and objective tests for entrapment). 
 101. Id. at 413-14; Searcy, 233 F.3d at 1100-01.  
 102. Searcy, 233 F.3d at 1096. 
 103. Id. at 1098, 1100. 
 104. State v. Vallejos, 945 P.2d 957, 961 (N.M. 1997) (holding that a judge may first rule as a 
matter of law; then the accused has a second opportunity to argue the defense before a jury). 
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There are other hybrid configurations.  One can imagine the objective 
test concerning outrageous police conduct, decided by a jury.  In civil 
rights cases, for instance, jurors are frequent arbiters of improper police 
conduct.105  One can also imagine the subjective test on predisposition 
being decided by a judge in a pre-trial hearing. 
Through dramatic acting and artifices,106 undercover agents have 
posed as seductive, mini-skirted prostitutes,107 as Arab sheiks,108 as male 
prostitutes,109 as drug dealers,110 as con-artists,111 as war veterans,112 as 
Wall Street brokers,113 as racketeers,114 and as politicians.115  Rogue 
informants commit an unbridled array of crimes and offer their status as 
 
 105. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
393, 397 (1971) (permitting actions for damages pursuant to violations of the Fourth Amendment by 
federal agents to proceed in federal court). 
 106. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441 (stating that “artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch” 
criminals). 
 107. See generally, Gregory G. Sarno, Entrapment Defense in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 12 
A.L.R. 4th 413.  See also, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that the FBI’s manipulation of a prostitute, who was a heroin user, into becoming an 
informant and the prostitute’s use of sex to deceive defendant into believing she was an intimate 
friend so that she could lure him into selling heroin was “not so shocking as to violate the due 
process clause”). 
 108. United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (explaining that the great 
Abscam undercover investigation of United States congressmen, in which the FBI posed as wealthy 
Arabs trying to bribe members of Congress to ensure that the congressmen would introduce 
immigration legislation). 
 109. See generally. Sarno, supra note 107; see also State v. Trombley, 206 A.2d 482, 483 
(Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964) (describing how a police officer in civilian clothes approached defendant’s car 
and offered to engage in a sex act with him). 
 110. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 424 (1973) (undercover agent supplied an essential 
chemical for manufacturing methamphetamine to seller, without which the seller could not make the 
drug).  The drug business concerns addictions.  It is very easy for the police to prey on the needs of those 
addicted in the drug trade to sell a higher amount.  People v. Turner, 210 N.W.2d 336, 342-43 (Mich. 
1973). 
 111. See David Jackson, Jeff Coen, & Ray Gibson, FBI Mole had Long History of Fraud – but 
Looked Great, CHI. TRIB. Jan. 11, 2007, at 1 (stating that “Andre P. Johnson cut a dapper figure as 
he tooled around the South Side with Ald. Arenda Troutman . . . [I]n addition to his elegant suits 
and designer eyeglasses, he wore an unusual accessory: a hidden FBI tape recorder . . . Johnson is 
the undercover mole whose wiretapped conversations with Troutman form the basis of the federal 
bribery charge.”). 
 112. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 439 (1932) (posing as friendly addicted war 
veteran). 
 113. See Whelan, supra note 71, at 1198.  In the John DeLorean trial, the undercover agents 
convinced DeLorean to sign over the entire voting stock of his fledgling company to federal agents 
posing as drug dealers.  Id. 
 114. See id. at 1193; see also LECARRE, supra note 1. 
 115. Matt O’Connor, Life as an FBI Mole in Berwyn: Former Alderman Brings Bribery to 
Light, but He Lost His Job and Faced a Mental Breakdown, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23 2006, at 1 (telling 
the story of how former alderman Alex Bojovic went undercover and became an FBI “mole”).  
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“undercover informants” as a defense.  They are immune from 
prosecution because of the prosecutor’s dependency on the informant in 
greater cases.  In one situation in New York, a defendant caught on a 
robbery charge in an adjacent county argued that he was an undercover 
agent for the Drug Enforcement Agency because his instructions were 
open-ended to engage in any nefarious activity.116 
Undercover agents are frequently supported with fancy cars, 
money, elaborate apartments, and luxurious clothes.117  It is a cat and 
mouse game where the charismatic undercover agents and the detectives 
orchestrating the investigation share as much conspiratorial drama as the 
criminals themselves.118 
IV. SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT AND MANIPULATION  
A. Sentencing Entrapment 
The sentencing entrapment defense refutes the factual enhancements 
which aggravate a defendant’s sentence.119  The sentencing jury considers 
whether the defendant, who was predisposed to commit a crime, had a 
previous intent or willingly committed additional acts related to the 
crime.120  Several courts disparage the notion of “sentencing entrapment” 
 
 116. See Timothy Williams, Robbery Suspect Says the D.E.A. Made Him Do It, N. Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 19, 2007, at B1 (noting that “[m]any people accused of crimes come up with unusual defenses 
and alibis, but one sad-faced man now imprisoned at Rikers Island has offered a novel one.  He says 
he was working as an undercover operative and committed a home-invasion robbery in 2004 with 
the full knowledge and approval of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency . . . The D.E.A. has 
acknowledged that Mr. Medina, 24, was under contract as an informant . . . Mr. Medina was quickly 
able to infiltrate, under D.E.A. orders, a crew that robbed drug dealers, a fact the agency has 
confirmed.”). 
 117. See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1461-67  (D.C. Cir. 1983) (being the famous 
Abscam case where FBI agents posed as wealthy Arab sheiks, interested in making certain 
investments in return for favorable congressional legislation). 
 118. See State v. Lively, 921 P. 2d 1035, 1048 (1996) (stating that “[t]he conduct of the 
informant here is so closely related to the actions of the Defendant we conclude that the informant 
controlled the criminal activity from start to finish.”). 
 119. United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1103 (8th Cir. 2000) (recognizing sentencing 
entrapment, but remanded to determine if defendant was entrapped to sell crack cocaine); Leech v. State, 
66 P.3d 987, 990 (Okla. Crim, App. 2003) (explaining that persons who characteristically possess small 
amounts of drugs could be entrapped into trafficking in drugs). 
 120. Leech, 66 P.3d at 990-91 (holding that the defendant became “ready and willing” to commit 
the greater crime during the course of the transaction). 
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for the simple reason that a person who commits an offense is predisposed 
to commit additional features related to the offense.121 
Criminal behavior implies an inherent deviant indoctrination.  Many 
social criminal behaviorists recognize that criminals evolve from singular 
misdemeanors to aggravated felonies.122  A person who is initially 
predisposed to commit a crime is no longer an “innocent” person as to that 
entire species of crime.  Such a person has tasted the fruits and allure of 
criminal behavior.  Indeed, predisposition is the basis of the venerable 
Similar Acts rule, where evidence of crimes of the same general nature may 
be admitted at trial to show motive, intent, scheme, and manner of 
action.123  The similar acts rule is predicated on the notion that a pattern of 
similar conduct may be indicative of the suspect’s intent.124  One cannot be 
entrapped when one engages in a reign of similar conduct. 
On the other hand, an individual who commits an underlying crime 
may be unwilling to commit a greater crime or unwilling to commit 
additional acts related to the crime.  People commit daily acts of venial sins 
or misdemeanors, yet are unwilling to commit mortal sins or aggravated 
felonies related to their acts.  A person may commit an assault, but may be 
unwilling to kill.  A person may cheat on her taxes, but never cheat in her 
business accounting practices.  A person may deal in small amounts of 
drugs, but never traffic in large amounts.125 
 
 121. In United States v. Miller, where the accused who sold powder cocaine was predisposed to sell 
crack, the court held that sentencing entrapment is a defunct doctrine and impermissible in the 11th 
Circuit.  71 F.3d 813, 818 (11th Cir. 1996).  Nor is the defense theory of partial entrapment permissible.  
Id.  A number of federal courts do not recognize a partial entrapment defense.  In the federal arena, the 
First, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits accept the doctrine of sentencing entrapment, which 
focuses on the defendant's predisposition.  See, e.g., Searcy, 233 F.3d at 1101 (accepting doctrine as 
defense; proper analysis focuses on defendant's predisposition).  The Searcy court accepted 
sentencing entrapment, but few courts find it under the facts.  Typically, there are other facts 
indicative of the accused's willingness to engage in a higher crime.  See also United States v. Lacey, 
86 F.3d 956, 962-63, 966 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding sufficient evidence of defendant’s engagement 
in large drug deals to overcome his argument of sentencing entrapment or manipulation). 
 122. LARRY J. SIEGEL, ET AL., JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 104-
137 (Thomson, Wadsworth Publishing 2003).  The inclination of the criminal is defined: "the only 
way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it."  BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 566 (16th Ed. 
1992) (quotation by Oscar Wilde).  
 123. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (stating that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.  It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon 
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance 
of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature 
of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.”).   
 124. Id. 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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A venial sinner may be impervious to mortal sins.  It is, of course, 
possible that a small crime may be indicative of a person’s predisposition 
to commit a greater offense – like the young boy who brutalizes dogs and 
then kills his friend.126  Yet, criminal behavior is no forgone conclusion of 
predisposition.  Many police officers, prosecutors, and judges have 
personally experienced wild and sordid pasts and have avoided criminal 
predisposition. 
Sentencing entrapment arguments are rarely successful because other 
factors suggest that the accused, while initially reticent in committing a 
higher offense, grew eager to comply with the undercover officer’s 
demands.127  In the Miller case for instance, the suspect, initially reluctant, 
eagerly engaged in an elaborate cooking scheme to multiply the cocaine.128  
On the other hand, in the Cannon case,129 a defendant who was unwilling 
to buy handguns was unfairly coaxed into buying a machine gun at an 
outrageous discount, thereby increasing his potential sentence by 25 
years.130  Entrapment conveys undue persuasion; manipulation conveys 
inordinate direction. 
B. Sentencing Manipulation  
Sentencing manipulation, like the objective test, focuses on police 
investigative methods which steer suspects into greater sentences.131  For 
example, an undercover agent engages in multiple drug purchases with a 
defendant for the sole purpose of increasing the defendant’s sentencing 
 
 126. Another example would be a small time drug dealer who escalates the amount of drugs he 
or she deals.  See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 742 F.2d 840, 841-42 (5th Cir. 1984) (charging a 
defendant with a previous narcotics conviction with “multi-hundred thousand dollar cocaine deals”). 
 127. See, e.g.,  Miller, 71 F.3d  at 817-18. 
 128. Id. at 814-15.  The accused, who sold powder cocaine, was predisposed to sell crack.  Id. 
at 816-17.  While the defense argued that the government manipulated the transaction from powder 
to crack to achieve a greater sentence against the accused, the Miller court abstained from this 
finding because there was plenty of other evidence indicating the accused was trafficking in cocaine 
and because the trial jury rejected the accused's defense to entrapment.  Id.  See also Searcy, 233 
F.3d at 1101 (accepting doctrine as defense; proper analysis focuses on defendant's predisposition).  
The Searcy court accepted sentencing entrapment, but few courts find it under the facts.  Typically, 
there are other facts indicative of the accused's willingness to engage in a higher crime.  See also 
United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 962-63, 966 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding sufficient evidence of 
defendant’s engagement in large drug deals to overcome his argument of sentencing entrapment or 
manipulation). 
 129. United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Watson v. United 
States 128 S. Ct 579 (2007).  For an explanation of the abrogation of Cannon, see supra note 7. 
 130. Id. at 1500-01, 1506. 
 131. See United States v. Lora, 129 F. Supp. 2d, 77, 89 (D. Mass. 2001) (explaining the 
difference between sentencing manipulation and sentencing entrapment). 
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exposure.132  Or, the accused agrees to deliver drugs, but is steered into 
delivering it near a playground, where mandatory sentences attach.  A 
defendant’s conduct is manipulated towards greater punitive schemes for 
no other “legitimate law enforcement purpose.”133 
Several jurisdictions refuse to recognize the sentencing manipulation 
doctrine because the investigatory method is solely the province of the 
prosecution.134  Many complex investigations require greater proofs to 
unravel the intricacies of the criminal's behavior.135  Nefarious drug crimes 
require an undercover agent to develop trust and patience with the long 
chain of drug suppliers.136  A higher quantum of proof is necessary, where 
the prosecution witnesses are usually incredible, immunized drug dealers 
or disreputable informants. 137  Fee arrangements with informants and 
promises of reduced charges significantly discredit the witnesses and 
weaken the prosecution’s case.  The prosecution’s burden of proof is 
compromised through incompetent and unreliable evidence.  
Consequently, the prosecution needs much latitude to probe the extent of a 
criminal enterprise, to determine whether co-conspirators exist, and to trace 
the distribution hierarchy.138  Since the prosecution bears the burden of 
proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution must exercise 
 
 132. Id. at 89-90. 
 133. People v. Smith, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 831, 857 (2002), rev’d on other grounds, People v. Smith, 
80 P.3d 662 (Cal. 2003). 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting 
defendant’s proposed rule that would find sentencing manipulation whenever the government 
continues to investigate after accumulating enough evidence to indict). 
 135. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (stating that “[t]he illicit manufacture 
of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident, but a continuing, though illegal, business 
enterprise.”). 
 136. United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that “[the] government’s 
evidence showed that an established drug dealer will not readily sell large quantities of drugs to a 
new customer and that repeated buys are necessary to gain the dealer’s confidence.”).  
 137. Baker, 65 F.3d at 1500 (noting that charging delays are difficult to prove because there are 
often legitimate government purposes for stringing out the investigation before arrest). 
 138. As the court in Baker noted, "[s]uch a rule 'would unnecessarily and unfairly restrict the 
discretion and judgment of investigators and prosecutors.  Police . . . must be given leeway to probe 
the depth and extent of a criminal enterprise, to determine whether coconspirators exist, and to trace 
[the drug] deeper into the distribution hierarchy.’”  Baker, 65 F.3d at 1500 (quoting United States v. 
Calva, 979 F.2d 119, 123 (8th Cir. 1992)).  “[I]t is legitimate for police to continue to deal with 
someone with whom they have already engaged in illicit transactions in order to establish that 
person’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Lora, 129 F.Supp.2d 77, 89, n. 15. (D. 
Mass 2001).  See also United States v. Estrada, 256 F.3d 466, 476 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
defendant did not present sufficient sentencing entrapment claim). 
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its own judgment in determining when the investigation is sufficient.139  
The Separation of Powers doctrine guarantees to the prosecution the 
discretion to decide the breadth and conclusion of the investigation.140  
“[T]he defense of entrapment . . . was not intended to give the federal 
judiciary a ‘chancellor’s foot’ veto over law enforcement practices of 
which it did not approve.”141 
C. Reverse Sting Operations  
Reverse sting operations exemplify manipulations.  Reverse sting 
operations occur when a government agent controls the supply of 
contraband and offers attractive inducements to potential buyers, who are 
frequently addicted, poor, or distressed.142  A typical “sting” operation 
requires the government to operate as a passive party waiting for criminal 
encounters.143  A reverse sting operation requires the government to 
undertake an active role, like being the seller, in inducing criminal 
activity.144  The government may, for instance, sell guns or drugs at 
artificial prices to make arrests.  In such operations, it is common to 
encounter government informants or government agents who are more 
blameworthy than the buyers.145  State and federal courts are uniformly 
 
 139. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478 at 1500 (stating, “[m]oreover, since the government bears the burden 
of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it must be permitted to exercise its own judgment in 
determining at what point in an investigation enough evidence has been obtained.”). 
 140. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46-47 (1992).  In Williams, the Court held that its 
supervisory power could not be used to dictate prosecutorial standards concerning the disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.  Id.  In the Minnesota case of State v. Soto, 562 N.W. 2d 299 
(Minn. 1997), the prosecution reaffirmed its need to continue the drug investigation to discover the 
accomplices, the drug supplier, and to build trust with the drug supplier.  Repeated drug transactions 
with a suspect were necessary to develop trust in the drug community and to trace the drug dealer's 
supplier.  The Soto court refused to recognize sentencing manipulation as a factor at sentencing, 
unless there is egregious police conduct which goes beyond legitimate investigative purposes.  Id. at 
305 (quoting Barth, 990 F.2d at 424). 
 141. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973).  
 142. See Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire after Jacobson v. United States: Towards a 
More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1055, 1056 (1993). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (stating that “[u]nlike the traditional ‘sting’ operation, where undercover officers pose 
as buyers of illicit goods or services, in the ‘reverse sting’, law enforcement personnel act as 
sellers.”). 
 145. These reverse sting operations frequently amount to outrageous government conduct, even 
under the federal sentencing guidelines, allowing a reduction in sentence.  Under Application Note 14, a 
downward departure is warranted when a form of sentencing entrapment occurs.  U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, comment (n. 14).  Any court will sua sponte modify a sentence in cases 
concerning reverse sting operations.  In Leech v. State, 66 P.3d 987, 990 (Okla. Crim App. 2003), the 
Oklahoma Court of Appeals modified the sentence, stating, “[i]n a reverse sting operation such as this, it 
is not unusual to encounter informants who are more blameworthy than the defendant.  We find, under 
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suspicious of reverse sting operations because of deplorable police conduct 
which induces the weak and vulnerable.146  If the inducement preys on 
addictions, poverty, or other allures, then the reverse sting operation is 
subject to manipulation or entrapment arguments.147 
D. Sentencing Escalation – Altering Specific Intent  
The Michigan Supreme Court recognizes that governmental 
misconduct which manipulates a person into committing a criminal offense 
or even a higher grade offense may be relevant to the accused’s intent: 
Police misconduct, standing alone, tells us nothing about the 
defendant.  However, if the defendant has an enhanced intent that was 
the product of police conduct or any other precipitating factor, and the 
enhanced intent can be shown in a manner that satisfies the 
requirements for a sentencing departure, . . . [then] it is permissible for 
a court to consider that enhanced intent in making a departure.148 
This case arose from a series of crack cocaine sales by Deon Claypool 
to an undercover officer.149  According to the defense, the police 
manipulated the defendant, who was addicted to drugs, by making repeated 
purchases for increasing quantities of cocaine by paying the defendant 
$500 more than the going rate for crack cocaine.150  The prosecutor 
countered that investigative jurisdiction rests with the prosecutor’s office 
and that the prosecutor had many reasons for prolonging the investigation 
for the undercover agent to build trust in the drug community.151  The trial 
court found nevertheless that the extra $500 was an improper inducement, 
and that the prosecution intentionally prevented the defendant from getting 
 
all the facts of this case, that the sentence should be modified to ten (10) years imprisonment.”  
Challenges to the reverse sting method of police investigation have been rejected on many 
occasions.  See, e.g., United States v. Savage, 701 F.2d 867, 869 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Gianni, 678 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308, 1314 (5th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. (1982), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 
(5th Cir. 1984), rejected by United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 146. Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent 
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1111 (1951). 
 147. Id. 
 148. People v. Claypool, 684 N.W.2d 278, 283-284 (Mich. 2004) (stating that “if it can be 
objectively and verifiably shown that police conduct or some other precipitating cause altered a 
defendant’s intent, that altered intent can be considered by the sentencing judge as a ground for a 
downward sentence departure.”).  Id. at 280. 
 149. Id. at 281.  A Michigan statute allowed sentencing downward departure “if the court has a 
substantial and compelling reason for that departure and states on the record the reasons for 
departure.”  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.34(3) 
 150. Claypool, 684 N.W.2d at 281. 
 151. Id. 
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substance abuse treatment.152  The trial court reduced the defendant’s 
sentence by two years.153 
The Michigan Supreme Court recast the sentencing entrapment 
argument as sentencing manipulation or sentencing escalation.154  
Defendant’s intent was altered by the manipulative acts of the undercover 
agents.155  Moreover, the crime was a specific intent crime, where intent 
was paramount.156  Defenses which alter a defendant’s mens rea are readily 
admissible with specific intent offenses.157  The Claypool court continued: 
The element of intent to sell drugs is left untouched; indeed, defendant 
himself admitted that he sold drugs.  However, defendant’s intent 
concerning the amount of drugs he sold may have been altered in this 
case when the police repeatedly returned to him to buy ever-increasing 
amounts, if those amounts were in fact greater than what defendant 
originally intended to sell.158 
The specific intent formula derived from the fundamental incongruity 
of a heightened intent on one hand, and the exclusion of evidence that 
might defeat that heightened intent.159  If the specific intent to commit a 
crime is vigorously massaged by an undercover officer, then the 
defendant’s intent is reduced.160 
E. Piercing the Prosecutorial Veil of Discretion 
There are occasions when the courts must pierce the prosecutorial veil 
of discretion.  There are constitutional constraints on police investigative 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 282. 
 154. Id.  See also People v. Fields, 448 Mich. 58, 79 (Mich. 1995).  “[T]he Court found that the 
government’s actions, although not rising to the level of entrapment, purposefully escalated the 
crime.  This last factor is of particular importance in our approval . . . .  As a mitigating 
circumstance surrounding the offense, it weighs heavily in favor of a deviation from the statutory 
minimum.” Id. (discussing People v. Shinholster, 196 Mich. App. 531 (1992)) (emphasis added). 
 155. Claypool, 470 N.W.2d at 283-84 (permitting downward departures based on police 
conduct, but remanding to the trial court to provide its reasons for doing so on the record).  But see 
the dissent, which argues that the mens rea element is really motive, not intent.  Id. at 289 
(Corrigan, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 156. See Derrick Augustus Carter, Bifurcations of Consciousness: The Elimination of the Self-
Induced Intoxication Excuse, 64 MO. L. REV. 383, 403-09 (1999) (discussing defenses to general 
and specific intent crimes). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Claypool, 470 N.W.2d. at 286. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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methods through the Fourth Amendment concerning search and seizure,161 
the Fifth Amendment concerning confessions,162 and Sixth Amendment 
concerning speedy trial.163  There are additional due process constraints on 
investigative methods concerning eyewitness identification,164 vindictive 
and selective prosecution,165 overcharging,166 and investigative methods.167  
The courts will impose their supervisory powers over abusive investigative 
tactics that taint the administration of justice.168   
Some courts identify malicious investigations as those where the 
police manipulate the charges "for no legitimate law enforcement purpose[, 
but solely] to increase the severity of the defendant’s sentence."169  In 
United States v. Staufer,170 for instance, the government agent preyed upon 
the suspect's poverty and depression to encourage a reluctant suspect to sell 
more LSD than the suspect originally intended.171  In determining whether 
the government improperly prolonged its investigation for no legitimate 
purpose, courts examine several factors, such as the length of time between 
the first offense and the arrest, whether there was an immediate need to 
arrest the suspect, whether the suspect had committed a violent offense, 
whether continued investigation would ensnare a co-conspirator, and 
whether delay would provide a greater understanding of the nature of the 
enterprise.172  A hearing on the objectives of the undercover operation is 
required. 
 
 161. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1961); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 
(1980) (stating that arrest warrant needed to make arrest at home). 
 162. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) (extending rights before 
interrogation). 
 163. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 536 (1972) (concerning speedy trial rights). 
 164. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967) (concerning due process rights in 
lineups). 
 165. See  North Carolina v. Pearce, 396 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1969). 
 166. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (noting that the concept of plea 
bargaining “presuppose[s] fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor”); 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (prosecutor may threaten to bring greater charges 
to convince an accused to plead guilty to lesser charges, but only if the prosecutor has probable 
cause to believe that the accused committed the offense). 
 167. See, e.g., Rochin v. People of California, 342 U.S. 165, 166, 174 (1952) (holding it is a 
due process violation to pump defendant’s stomach to retrieve drug capsules); McNabb v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1943) (delay in arrest); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 
(1957) (delay in arraignment). 
 168. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448, 452 (1932). 
 169. See e.g., People v. Smith, 120 Cal. Rptr.2d 831 (2001) (rev’d on other grounds, 80 P.3d 662 
(Cal. 2003)). 
 170. United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 171. Id.  at 1105. 
 172. United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 75-76 (7th Cir. 1996).  In Garcia, however, the Court held 
that “there is no defense of sentencing manipulation in this circuit,” at least to instances of prolonged 
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In United States v. Ramirez-Rangel,173 the court held that: 
[I]t was error for the district court to deny the motion to reveal the 
identity of the informant without holding an in camera hearing to 
determine whether the informant’s testimony would be relevant and 
helpful to the defendants on the question of sentencing entrapment. . . . 
If the district court concludes that the testimony is relevant, . . . then 
the district court must conduct a hearing to resolve that claim[.]174 
Several cases illustrate that, depending on their rewards and 
commissions, undercover agents advantageously manipulate charges 
against their prey.175  The manipulation powers of the undercover 
investigator or informant coincide with mandatory sentences, which 
enhance punishment for slight factual variances.176  In short, the 
prosecution very frequently delegates its charging powers to a salacious 
informant.  The agent or informant can approach a suspect, suggest a drug 
deal, name the amount and place, engage in suggestive selling techniques, 
provide the drugs, determine the mandatory sentence scheme, and reap a 
reward.177  Most confidential informants seek great incentives to arrange 
large scale drug transactions.178  Prosecutorial discretion is undermined 
when the investigation is steered by an undercover agent or informant of 
 
police investigations.  Id. at 76.  “A suspect has no constitutional right to be arrested when the police 
have probable cause.”  Id.  These various terms refer to the same notion of objective entrapment, where 
the police allow the investigation to unnecessarily continue in order to enhance and manipulate the 
charges and mandatory sentences against the suspect.  See United States v. Lora, 129 F.Supp.2d 77, 89 
(D.Mass 2001). 
 173. 103 F.3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 174. Id. at 1508. 
 175. See Defense Presses Agent in DeLorean Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1984, at 16.  In the 
John DeLorean case, one agent testified “that it was ‘possible’ he had once referred to the informer 
who proposed John Z. DeLorean for a narcotics investigation as his ‘meal ticket’.”  Id. 
 176. See United States v. Blakely, 542 U.S. 296, 300 (2004).  In the underlying case, the trial 
court increased the defendant’s sentence because of victim’s statements rendered at sentencing.  The 
Supreme Court ultimately reversed the defendant’s sentence.  Id. at 313-14.  For further discussion 
of Blakely, see infra notes 201-202 and accompanying text. 
 177. As the Eighth Circuit discussed in United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1247 (8th Cir. 1996), 
“sentencing discretion is delegated all the way down to the individual drug agent operating in the field.” 
(quoting United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1994)).  “Because of the great potential 
for abuse, these cases require the most careful scrutiny and a probing examination by the district court.”  
Id.  See also United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107-08 (9th. Cir. 1994) (noting that “[d]rug agents 
can decide, apparently without any supervision by anybody to negotiate with somebody for an ounce, a 
pound, a kilo, 100 kilos, a million kilos of a substance and, of course, if the defendant bites at the bait, 
then that amount chosen by the drug agent will determine his drug sentence.”). 
 178. Stavig, 80 F.3d at 1247. 
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dubious credibility and great manipulative skills.179  Sentencing defenses 
are essential to unravel the inherent due process failings related to 
enhancements and manipulations.  
F. Imperfect Sentencing Defenses 
Many state sentencing statutes recognize partial defenses, quasi-
defenses, or imperfect defenses at sentencing.180  As such, sentencing 
entrapment issues can be corralled through the procedural mechanism of an 
imperfect defense at sentencing.  In Tennessee, for example, the court may 
reduce a sentence if "[s]ubstantial grounds exist tending to excuse or justify 
the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense."181 
State sentencing guidelines recognize some latitude for the sentencing 
court to consider matters inadmissible at trial, but material to the 
presentence report.182  Frequently, inadmissible evidence at trial may be 
highly relevant at sentencing in order to accurately gage the accused’s 
culpability.183 
Some states, like Indiana, apply a statutory form of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances at sentencing.184  Sentencing entrapment or 
sentencing manipulation, for instance, would fall under the rubric of victim 
provocation, where "[t]he victim of the crime induced or facilitated the 
offense."185  The victim in entrapment cases would arguably be the 
government through the conspiratorial undercover operation.186  Many 
states have catch-all sentencing provisions, which allow defenses where 
there are substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the crime, though 
failing to establish a defense.187  Nonetheless, many federal jurisdictions do 
 
 179. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1953).  This amounts to prosecutorial 
misconduct in the investigation stage.  Id.  The court cannot be an accomplice to police misconduct.  
Id. 
 180. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-35-113(3) (2008). 
 181. Id. 
 182. People v. Claypool, 684 N.W.2d 278, 286 (Mich. 2004). 
 183. See Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1205 (Alaska 1983) (holding illegal evidence is 
admissible only where it is clear that the evidence was not obtained for purposes of influencing the 
sentencing judge).  See also Smith v. State, 517 A.2d 1081, 1085 (Md. 1986) (holding any evidence 
the court deems to have probative force may be received regardless of its admissibility under the 
exclusionary rules of evidence). 
 184. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-38-1-7.1, Considerations in Imposing Sentence. 
 185. See id. at (b)(3). 
 186. In setting up bogus undercover operations, there is no private victim. 
 187. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Entrapment, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1403, 1416-
22 (2004) (employing “quasi-entrapment” on the use of community policing). 
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not recognize partial sentencing defenses such as sentencing entrapment or 
sentencing manipulation.188 
Mitigation efforts at sentencing fall far short of formal defenses.  
Mitigation factors essentially acknowledge the truth of the aggravating 
factors, but beg for “consideration” to reduce the accused’s sentence.  
Mitigation conveys compromise and does not eliminate essential 
aggravating factors.  Unlike “mitigation” factors, sentencing defenses 
convey a full panoply of safeguards: the right to present witnesses and 
expert witnesses, the right to cross-examine those witnesses, and the right 
to dispute the enhancement altogether. 
In bifurcated sentencing proceedings in capital death penalty cases, 
the accused has a right to raise new sentencing defenses as long as the 
defenses are not inconsistent with the accused’s prior conviction.189  
Sentencing entrapment evidence is admissible because such evidence 
shows “how, not whether, the defendant committed the crime.”190 
V.  THE PROSECUTOR’S ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE 
The prosecutor’s sentencing artillery is riddled with sentencing 
enhancement statutes,191 mandatory drug sentences,192 repeat offender 
prosecutions,193 presumptive sentencing guidelines,194 and factual 
 
 188. Id. at 1411-15. 
 189. See Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 523, 527 (2006) (holding that neither Eighth nor the 
Fourteenth Amendment granted capital murder defendant a right to present additional alibi evidence 
at resentencing, because such evidence was inconsistent with prior conviction). 
 190. Id. at 524; See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978), where the plurality of 
the Court held that evidence that accused played minor role in crime is admissible at the sentencing 
stage, because it is relevant to any aspect of defendant’s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers for a reduced sentence; see also Green v. 
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curium) (holding it proper for defendant to introduce hearsay 
evidence at sentencing proceedings that a third party admitted to the murder). 
 191. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469-70 (2000) (concerning sentencing 
enhancement statute for racial hatred). 
 192. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996 (1991) (holding that mandatory sentence of 
life imprisonment with no parole for possessing over 650 grams of cocaine is constitutional).  
 193. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 17-18, 30-31 (2003) (affirming a mandatory 
sentence of twenty five years-to-life in prison imposed under California’s three strikes law for the 
theft of three golf clubs). 
 194. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004).  During the factual basis portion of 
the guilty plea, Blakely admitted to the elements of second-degree kidnapping and domestic-
violence and the firearm allegation.  Id. at 299.  After hearing Blakely’s wife describe additional 
horrible facts and cruelty, the judge rejected the forty nine to fifty three month range and increased 
Blakely’s sentence to ninety months (seven years and six months), an increase of three years and 
one month.  Id. at 300.  On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence, but the 
United States Supreme Court ultimately reversed it.  Id. at 301, 314.  For further discussion of 
Blakely, see infra notes 201-202 and accompanying text. 
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variances.195  A judge may find additional res gestae facts at sentencing, 
which may import a higher sentencing range.196  Previously, a judge could 
determine these factors by a preponderance of the evidence.197  A trilogy of 
cases has changed the sentencing enhancement landscape.198  In Apprendi 
v. New Jersey,199 concerning a racial hatred sentencing enhancement 
statute, the court found the racial hatred aspect must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt before a sentencing jury.200  Similarly in Blakely v. 
Washington,201 where the judge increased the sentence beyond the 
 
 195. Many wrongful convictions are caused by intentional prosecutorial manipulation and 
police conduct.  See Richard Moran, Op-Ed., The Presence of Malice, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at 
A21 (stating, “[m]y recently completed study of the 124 exonerations of death row inmates in 
America from 1973 to 2007 indicated that 80, or about two-thirds, of their so-called wrongful 
convictions resulted not from good-faith mistakes or errors but from intentional, willful, malicious 
prosecutions by criminal justice personnel . . . [W]hen a police officer manufactures or destroys 
evidence to further the likelihood of a conviction, then it is deceptive to term these conscious 
violations of the law.”). 
 196. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 228-29 (2005) (sentencing judge finding that 
defendant possessed more drugs than trial revealed).  Federal prosecutors have at their disposal the 
“Sentencing Package Doctrine,” which promotes a blanket rule that affords trial courts the 
discretion to resentence all defendants who happen to have multi-count convictions, regardless of 
whether the individual charges are interrelated.  Id.  See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 178 F.3d 
558, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining Sentencing Package Doctrine).  Id. at 570-71 (holding that 
when a defendant is found guilty on a multi-count indictment, there is a strong likelihood that the 
district court will craft a disposition in which the sentences on the various counts form part of an 
overall plan). 
 197. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1896) (holding that sentencing system 
requires the state to prove facts for sentencing only by a preponderance of the evidence). 
 198. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296; Booker, 
543 U.S. at 220. 
 199. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466.  Charles Apprendi was a convicted racist.  Id. at 471.  Apprendi 
fired shots “into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved into a previously all-
white neighborhood in Vineland, New Jersey.”  Id. at 469.  When Apprendi was arrested he admitted 
that he did not want an African-American family in the neighborhood, although he later retracted the 
statement.  Id.  The state grand jury indicted Apprendi on 23 counts of assault and weapons charges.  Id.  
There were no charges for hate crimes.  Id.  The prosecution offered Apprendi a guilty deal he could not 
refuse.  Apprendi agreed to plead to two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm and one count 
of unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb.  Id.  Amazingly, the prosecution dismissed the other 
20 counts.  Id. at 470.  As part of the plea agreement, however, the prosecution reserved the right to ask 
the court to impose a higher “enhanced” sentence on the ground that some of the offenses were 
committed for a biased purpose and that he hated Black people, which was contrary to a recently enacted 
New Jersey hate-crimes statute.  Id. 
 200. Id. at 490.  New Jersey’s hate crime law provided for an extended sentence term if the 
trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence, that “the defendant in committing the crime 
acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, 
gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.”  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 
1999-2000).  The extended term authorized by the hate crime law for second degree offenses is 
imprisonment “between 10 and 20 years.”  N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:43-7(a)(3) (2004).  The hate crime 
statute only applies if the defendant is convicted or pleads guilty to an underline offense.  Id. 
 201. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296. 
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presumptive range because of new facts presented at sentencing, the Court 
held the prosecutor must prove the new facts beyond a reasonable doubt 
and present them before a jury.202  In the third case, United States v. 
Booker,203 concerning a drug offense where the sentencing judge 
discovered more drugs than found at trial, the prosecutor had the burden of 
proving the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury.204  In 
Booker, the Supreme Court concluded the federal sentencing guidelines are 
now advisory, and no longer mandatory.205  The procedural theme of these 
cases is that any factual element that has the possibility of increasing the 
defendant’s maximum sentence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
before a jury.206 
In Harris v. United States,207 however, the court narrowly held that 
the reasonable doubt and jury requirement is not triggered with mandatory 
minimum sentences, only mandatory maximum sentences.208  Maximum 
sentences concern aggravated facts which are not presented to the jury.209  
Mandatory minimum sentences, however, concern findings within the 
jury’s verdict.210 
Mandatory sentences on slight factual variances are perfectly 
legal.211  Small differences in the quantity or type of drugs or where the 
drugs are sold significantly alter a defendant’s prison term.212  “Every new 
element that a prosecutor can threaten to charge is also an element that a 
defendant can threaten to contest [and present as a defense] at trial [or 
sentencing] and make the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” 213 
The accused has a reciprocal Sixth Amendment right and Fifth 
Amendment due process right to present a defense to the sentencing 
enhancement charges.214  If, for instance, an undercover agent induced 
Apprendi to commit a series of racial assaults, the government’s 
 
 202. Id. at 303-04. 
 203. Booker, 543 U.S. at 220. 
 204. Id. at 230-31. 
 205. Id. at 243-44. 
 206. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text. 
 207. Harris, v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 545 (2002). 
 208. Id. at 557. 
 209. Id. at 566-67. 
 210. Id. at 557. 
 211. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.  466, 485-86 (2000). 
 212. United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 213. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S., 296, 311 (2004). 
 214. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 232-34, 237-41 (1999) (holding that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Notice and Jury Trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment 
require enhancers that increase the maximum punishment to be charged in an indictment, submitted 
to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt). 
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conspiratorial influences would affect Apprendi’s actions.215  Due process 
would demand that Apprendi be afforded a fair opportunity to present a 
sentencing entrapment defense on the racial hatred element.216 
A. Sentencing Enhancement as Cell Reproduction 
Another way of understanding the phenomenon of sentencing 
enhancement is through biology and cell reproduction.  Each cell has a 
membrane and cell wall.217  Inside the cell is a nucleus, which is the control 
center of the cell.218  Imagine a cell as a criminal offense.  There are many 
elements in the cell, and the nucleus is the intent element and the heart of 
liability.  The jury must decide on each element of the cell beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Now imagine another cell invading the first cell.  This second cell 
could be a form of bacteria, virus, or any type of independent cell.  This 
second cell is a type of sentencing enhancement.  The original cell may 
merge with the additional cell, or the second cell may lodge itself 
independently within the first.  A jury must review all of the elements of 
the original cell and all of the elements of the second cell.  As 
manipulation, imagine that the creator of the second cell, which induces it 
to invade the first cell, is the government. 
B.  A Unitary v. Bifurcated Trial on Sentencing Enhancements 
When sentencing enhancement elements are integrated within the 
transaction, it is difficult to reserve the element for sentencing adjudication.  
For instance, in the Apprendi case, the reason for the series of assaults was 
racial hatred.219  If Apprendi had elected to go to trial on the assault 
charges, the prosecutor could not excise the evidence of hate crimes from 
the liability portion of the trial.220  The absence of information about the 
 
 215. Many courts hold that sentencing entrapment, not sentencing manipulation, may be a basis for 
a downward departure at sentencing.  United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995).  In 
Civil Rights cases, the F.B.I. encouraged informants to assist in assaults against the freedom riders in 
order not to blow their cover.  See RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS 151-53 (2006). 
 216. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 62 (1996) (O’Conner, J., dissenting).  While the 
legislature may be able to eliminate defenses that bear on intent, such as intoxication in Montana v. 
Egelhoff, the elimination must undergo a grueling test to determine its constitutionality.  The court 
must determine whether the defense is fundamental and historical, whether it is relevant to mens 
rea, and the public policy implications.  Id. at 43-44, 55. 
 217. See DONNA RAE SIEGFRIED, BIOLOGY FOR DUMMIES  22-35 (2001). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000). 
 220. See id. at 469-72. 
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss1/4
09-CARTER.DOC 1/29/2009  3:33:20 PM 
2009] TO CATCH THE LION, TETHER THE GOAT 165 
motive for the assaults would cause the jurors to doubt the coherence of the 
prosecution’s case.221  The New Jersey hate crimes statute was strictly a 
sentencing enhancement statute, but the hate evidence was material to the 
trial stage.222 
There is prejudice, however, in a unitary proceeding, where evidence 
of the sentencing enhancement is introduced at trial, because once the jury 
hears the aggravating sentencing evidence, they will be materially 
prejudiced to convict the accused as a “bad person,” and no jury instruction 
can cure the prejudice.223  Joinder of the sentencing enhancement element 
at the trial stage may confuse the jury and lead the jury to rely on one 
offense as corroborative of the other.224  Prejudice may develop if the 
accused wishes to testify at the trial phase, but not the sentencing phase.225  
A defendant’s silence at the trial phase would be damaging in the face of 
 
 221. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 853 A.2d 260, 268 (N.J. 2004), where the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that the potential for unfair prejudice from proof of a prior conviction element does not 
justify bifurcating a trial on a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. 
 222. See United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that the absence of 
information about all of the elements of the crime during trial might cause the jury to question the 
criminality of the defendant’s conduct and raise reasonable doubt).  
 223. Brown, 853 A.2d at 269 (Albin, J., dissenting) (arguing that juries cannot eliminate the 
prejudice of a case even with limiting jury instructions).  Despite this chance for prejudice, courts 
often refuse to bifurcate.  Several courts hold, for instance, that a felon in possession of weapons 
charges should be tried in one proceeding, not a bifurcated proceeding.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Dean, 76 F.3d 329, 332 (10th Cir. 1996) (adopting the reasoning of United States v. Collamore, 868 
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1989), and three other circuits); United States v. Koskela, 86 F.3d 122, 126 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (rejecting defendant’s bifurcation of felon-in-possession charges without analysis); 
United States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting defendant’s request to prevent 
jury from hearing evidence of his prior felony convictions because prosecution has burden of 
proving to the jury that defendant was, in fact, a felon at the time he possessed the firearm). 
 224. See Brown, 853 A.2d at 269 (Albin, J., dissenting) (discussing the difficulty many jurors 
will have in using evidence only for a specific purpose). 
 225. Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
The justification for a liberal rule on joinder of offenses appears to be the economy of a 
single trial.  The argument against joinder is that the defendant may be prejudiced for 
one or more of the following reasons: (1) he may become embarrassed or confounded in 
presenting separate defenses; (2) the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes 
charged to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from which is found 
his guilt of the other crime or crimes charged; or (3) the jury may cumulate the evidence 
of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not 
so find.  A less tangible, but perhaps equally persuasive, element of prejudice may reside 
in a latent feeling of hostility engendered by the charging of several crimes as distinct 
from only one. 
Id.  
31
Carter: To Catch the Lion, Tether the Goat
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
09-CARTER.DOC 1/29/2009  3:33:20 PM 
166 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:135 
his denial at the sentencing phase.226  Multiple counts induce improper 
inferences of combined guilt.227 
Juries, however, have the ability to consider multiple charges through 
coordinated, special verdicts.228  While the evidence related to sentencing 
enhancements may be introduced at the trial, the jury would refrain from 
rendering a verdict on the enhancement issue.  Upon guilt, the jury would 
then deliberate on the sentencing enhancement issue.  In civil cases, for 
instance, juries often determine coordinated, contingent verdicts that 
require various weights on several sets of facts.229   
Rules of Criminal Procedure allow joinder at trial of offenses “of the 
same or similar character.”230  Joining the underlying offense and the 
sentence enhancement offense in one trial under the res gestae test, 
concerning all the facts related to the transaction, may save time and avoid 
annoyance for the jury.  A unitary trial would avoid the expense and ordeal 
of recalling witnesses to the court and avoid repetitive testimony.  With a 
proper jury instruction, in accordance with special verdicts, the jury can 
coordinate multiple evidence and engage in separate deliberations, and 
thereby reduce the danger of jury confusion.231 
When the sentencing enhancement element can be carved from the 
underlying offense, it would be prejudicial to introduce the sentencing 
matters during the liability portion of the trial.232  Returning to our cell 
analogy, imagine that the second cell so intertwines with the first cell that 
both cells are indistinguishable.  In that case, the jury should hear the 
evidence of both cells in a unitary trial, and through carefully crafted jury 
instructions determine guilt at the liability stage from guilt at the sentencing 
stage.233  If the two cells, embedded together, are clearly separate, then the 
 
 226. See, e.g., Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (finding improper 
joinder of offenses at trial). 
 227. See, e.g., id. 
 228. Laura G. Dooley, National Juries for National Cases: Preserving Citizen Participation in 
Large-Scale Litigation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 411, 436-43, 447 (2008). 
 229. See generally Laura G. Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and 
Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325 (1995).  
 230. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a).  The court rules allow joinder when several offenses are not part of a 
single scheme or plan and are committed at different times and places.  Id. 
 231. Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
 232. State v. Brown, 853 A.2d 260, 269 (N.J. 2004) (Albin, J., dissenting) (arguing that issues 
should be bifurcated because juries cannot eliminate the prejudice of a case with limiting jury 
instructions). 
 233. FED. R. CRIM. P. 404.  An intriguing question is presented whether a sentence enhancement 
offense may be admissible under the similar acts doctrine.  Evidence of other crimes is admissible 
when relevant to (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) the absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common 
scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so relegated to each other that 
proof of the one tends to establish the other, and (5) the identity of the person charged with the 
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evidence of the second cell can be excised from the determination of 
liability at the first trial.  The second cell is then litigated at the sentencing 
stage.234 
C. Pretrial Notice of Sentencing Enhancement Charges 
As a proud advocate for deviation, a vigilant defense attorney must 
consider whether to contest potential sentencing defenses at the pretrial 
stage to reduce manipulative overcharging practices.  A pretrial hearing 
will also determine whether the sentencing enhancement charges are 
presented in a unitary or bifurcated proceeding.235  The prosecutor could 
theoretically charge each enhancement offense as a separate crime 
altogether, but separate charges from a singular transaction would normally 
result in concurrent sentences, which present little threat to the accused.236  
A prosecutor deals a significantly better hand with sentencing enhancement 
factors, which are consecutive and frequently mandatory.237 
The accused is entitled to know the sentencing consequences near 
the indictment stage in order to give the accused fair notice of the full 
extent of the jeopardy.238  For instance, the Apprendi defendant must know 
early in the criminal proceeding all of the potential charges, including the 
sentencing enhancement of hate crimes.239  Proper notice of the charges is 
 
commission of the crime on trial.  Id.  When the evidence is relevant and important to one of these 
five issues, it is generally conceded that the prejudicial effect may be outweighed by the probative 
value.  Id. 
 234. In addition to the bifurcated trial system, Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinion in 
Apprendi suggested other legislative alternatives in dealing with Apprendi’s new procedural 
requirements.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555-66 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The 
legislature could adopt: (1) single, mandatory sentences for each crime; (2) indeterminate sentences 
with parole chosen by judges within broad statutory sentence ranges; (3) the bifurcated system 
proposed above; (4) inverted guidelines with high sentences to each crime, followed by a list of 
mitigating factors; or (5) increase the top of each guideline range to the statutory maximum of the 
offense.  Id. 
 235. See George Frampton, Some Practical and Ethical Problems Of Prosecuting Public Officials, 
36 MD. L. REV. 5, 21 (1976) (stating, “[c]ertainly it is reasonable to suggest that every prosecutor ought 
to be under an affirmative ethical obligation to ensure that both he and the grand jury are exposed to both 
sides of a prospective criminal case, and whenever possible the defendant should also have some 
opportunity for input into the charging decision, even if the opportunity falls short of a full adversary 
hearing.  However, present ethical standards do not even touch on this subject.”). 
 236. See, e.g., Richard Mills, The Prosecutor: Charging and “Bargaining,” 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 
511, 514-15 (discussing options when an offender’s conduct violates more than one criminal 
statute). 
 237. See the trifecta cases: Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker, discussed supra notes 199-206. 
 238. Perhaps, the accused should know the sentencing consequences by the preliminary 
examination stage or indictment. 
 239. If the liability and sentencing enhancement issues are litigated in one unitary trial, the 
defense may wish to sanitize the predicate offense by stipulating to the initial offense, and litigate 
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required under the Constitution and to avoid any appearance of 
vindictiveness.240 
VI.  CONSPIRACY IN IMAGINARY CRIMES AND INTERNET PORN 
A. Conspiratorial Manipulation  
As a co-conspirator, the undercover investigator, directed by higher 
superiors, encourages the collective effort, which results in elaborate and 
efficient crimes.241  An embedded undercover operative must prove his or 
her loyalty to the group and commit felonious offenses or some anti-social 
behavior.242  Some undercover investigators are licensed to roam free to 
ensnare as many people as possible in conspiratorial sting operations.243  
Confidential informants, as spies, play both ends and reap significant 
rewards.244  Each suspect is less likely to abandon the criminal plan than if 
the suspect was acting alone.245  The symbiotic relationship between the 
suspect and the government agent breeds reliance, dependence, and 
loyalty.246 
The conspiratorial operation creates an irresistible pull, which “makes 
more likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for 
which the group was formed.”247   “In sum, the danger which a 
conspiracy generates is not confined to the substantive offense which is 
the immediate aim of the enterprise.”248  Once the government plays a 
conspiratorial role in aggravating the criminal action, the accused’s intent 
is altered by the government’s role in escalating the criminal venture.249 
 
the sentence enhancer.  This is essentially what the accused did in Apprendi.  Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
466 at 470.  The accused pled guilty to the predicate assault, but litigated the hate crimes provision 
at sentencing.  Id. 
 240. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 232-34, 237-41 (1999) (holding that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Notice and Jury Trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment 
require enhancers that increase the maximum punishment must be charged in an indictment, 
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 241. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 424-26. 
 242. Donnelly, supra note 146, at 1092-94, 1111  
 243. See BLAKESLEE, supra note 11, at 17-18 (describing the rogue undercover agent assigned 
to render as many drug convictions as possible in a small Texas town). 
 244. Donnelly, supra note 146, at 1092-94. 
 245. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 425. 
 246. Donnelly, supra note 146, at 1092-94, 1111. 
 247. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1960). 
 248. Id. at 594. 
 249. Claypool, 684 N.W. 2d 278, 286 (Mich. 2004). 
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Entrapment is seldom appreciated as an influential conspiratorial 
event.250  Many unsuccessful entrapment claims fail to rebut the 
predisposition evidence with the practical behavioral influences that a 
conspiracy entails.  Expert testimony on the dynamic of group action and 
its effect on individual behavior clarifies the suspect’s susceptibility and 
undue influences.251  A suspect on the fringes of society can find 
friendship, business dealings, love, and even sex from an undercover 
operative. 252  Such conspiratorial evidence may dilute the suspect’s 
culpability in both the liability phase and sentencing phase.253  The 
conspiratorial influences fall short of entrapment, but prevail as a type of 
diminished capacity.254  The power of the group dynamic, sponsored by the 
government agent, can affect the individual’s will.255 
B. Undercover Operations Which Induce Imaginary Crimes   
A conspiracy exists where two or more persons agree to commit a 
criminal offense.256  If the offense is completed, each person is guilty of the 
completed offense and a separate count of conspiracy to commit the 
offense.257  Each conspirator is also guilty of additional acts reasonably 
foreseeable from their agreement.258  Conspiracy law is established to 
 
 250. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 424, 436 (1973) (holding that the 
undercover agent suppling the essential ingredient to make an illegal drug was not entrapment). 
 251. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 86-87 (1985) (discussing defendant’s right to 
have a psychiatrist testify as an expert witness). 
 252. See State v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035, 1048-49 (Wash. 1996); United States v. Cuervelo, 949 
F.2d 559, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1991).  Sex is an attractive inducement.  In Lively, the court held that a 
government agent took advantage of a vulnerable single mother who attended Alcoholics 
Anonymous, by befriending her and beginning a sexual relationship in order to involve her in drug 
activities.  Lively, 921 P.2d at 1048-49.  See also Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 568-69 (remanding case to 
consider whether the government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its investigatory 
arsenal). 
 253. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 7 (2006).  The duress defense allows the 
defendant to “avoid liability . . . because coercive conditions or necessity negates a conclusion of guilt 
even though the necessary mens rea was present.”  Id. (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 
(1980); see also Daniel L. Abelson, Sentencing Entrapment: An Overview and Analysis, 86 MARQ. L. 
REV. 773, 786-94 (2003). 
 254. See Daniel L. Abelson, Sentencing Entrapment: An Overview and Analysis, 86 MARQ. L. 
REV. 773, 786-94 (2003). 
 255. United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an 
entrapment hearing should be held to determine objectives of the undercover operation). 
 256. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 424-26. 
 257. Id. 
 258. State v. Bridges, 628 A.2d 270, 281 (N.J. 1993) (holding defendants liable for accidental 
murders reasonably foreseeable as the natural consequences of the drug conspiracy transaction); see 
also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946) (holding conspirators are liable for all 
acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy). 
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offset the special dangers that group action entail regarding more 
sophisticated crimes.259 
Many states operate under a unilateral theory of conspiracy wherein a 
person may be prosecuted for a two-party conspiracy, even though one of 
the parties is immune from prosecution.260  For instance, a person may be 
prosecuted for conspiracy to commit murder by unwittingly hiring an 
undercover police agent, who is immune from prosecution.261 
It is textbook law that a person may also be prosecuted for conspiring 
to commit a crime that is imaginary.262  Factual impossibility is no 
defense.263  For instance, if one agrees with an undercover agent to rob a 
drug house that does not exist, the impossibility of the crime is no defense.  
If an overt step is made towards the commission of that imaginary crime, 
then such a person can be prosecuted for conspiracy to commit robbery.264 
In United States v. Sanchez,265 the undercover agent orchestrated a 
fictitious plan to rob a drug house with a group of suspected drug 
dealers.266  The undercover agent imagined the amount of drugs and 
convinced the men to rob the house.267  The defendants were successfully 
convicted of conspiracy to rob the drug house based on the amount of 
drugs concocted by the agent.268  The court held that the government's 
fictitious reverse sting operation which involved a large quantity of 
 
 259. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 425-26. 
 260. See, e.g., Garcia v. State, 394 N.E. 2d 106, 108-09 (1979).  In Garcia, a police informant 
conspired with the defendant wife to kill her husband.  Id. at 107.  The court found the defendant 
guilty of conspiracy even though the informant had no intent to accomplish the act.  Id. at 110.  The 
court ruled that this was a unilateral conspiracy, replacing the traditional bilateral conspiracy 
concept.  Id. 
 261. See id. at 107-09.  A number of states operate under the bilateral doctrine, where there 
must be at least two legitimate people agreeing to commit the offense.  See id. at 108. 
 262. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 452.  The majority rule is that factual impossibility is no 
defense to a criminal conspiracy.  Id. 
 263. Id.  An overt step is essential to separate imaginary offenses from a purposeful intent.  Id.  
A step by any of the co-conspirators towards the commission of the crime applies to all of the co-
conspirators.  Id.   
 264. State statutes generally require an overt step towards the commission of the substantive 
offense to decipher “talk” from actual dangerousness.  In the federal arena, however, an overt step is 
unnecessary to prove conspiracy in many instances.  Many federal statutes have eliminated the overt step 
requirement.  See Model Penal Code § 5.03(5) (providing that “[n]o person may be convicted of 
conspiracy to commit a crime, other than a felony of the first or second degree, unless an overt act in 
pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by him or by a person with whom 
he conspired.”) (emphasis added). 
 265. 138 F.3d 1410. 
 266. Id. at 1412. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
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imagined drugs did not, in and of itself, amount to the type of manipulative 
government conduct warranting a downward sentencing departure.269 
Individuals are easy prey for conspiratorial schemes.  Bluffing, 
bragging, and daring are no longer innocent acts associated with certain 
ethnic groups.  In one New Jersey terrorist case, for instance, the police 
used an informant of questionable veracity to penetrate a loose group of 
disenchanted Muslim men.270  The informant instructed the men on how to 
become terrorists, encouraged a holy war, and supplied the men with 
sophisticated weapons.271  The confederation of politically suspicious 
groups attracts wayward investigations which promote self-fulfilling 
prophecies. 
C. Internet Porn and Fantasy Speech 
Through the Internet, e-mail, text messages, and Facebook, 
undercover agents pose as youngsters seeking older men or pose as parents 
wishing to sell their children.272  With the Internet fantasy, several 
predators and curious adults fall for the allure of sexual trysts.273  
Encouraged to fulfill their fantasy, unwitting predators are met by aged, 
bald policemen, rather than Lolita-type seductresses.274 
 
 269. Id. at 1414. 
 270. David Kocieniewski, Informer’s Role Draws Praise and Questions, N. Y. TIMES, May 10, 
2007, at A1. 
 271. Id. 
 272. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which imposes criminal liability on anyone who “knowingly 
persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to 
engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense, or attempts to do so.”  See also United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(stating that “[a]t the time of § 2422(b)’s 1998 amendment, the House Judiciary Committee pointed 
out that law enforcement plays an important role in discovering child sex offenders on the Internet 
before they are able to victimize an actual child.  Those who believe they are victimizing children, 
even if they come into contact with a law enforcement officer who poses as a child, should be 
punished just as if a real child were involved.”).  
 273. See, e.g., id. at 143 (describing a 62-year-old man’s conversations through instant 
messaging with an adult informant he believed to be a 13-year-old girl). 
 274. See Abby Goodnough, Town is Shaken After Prosecutor’s Arrest in a Child-Sex Sting, N. 
Y. TIMES, Sept. 29 2007, at A8 (a popular Federal prosecutor from Florida, J. D. Roy Atchison, an 
involved father and devoted coach, was arrested in Detroit as he arranged with an undercover agent 
to have sex with a five-year-old girl.  Online, the former prosecutor posing as “fldaddy04,” stated 
that he was sexually gentle with young girls and had done it plenty of times.  Id.  “‘I adore 
everything about young girls,’ the profile says, ‘how they talk, think, act, walk, look.’”  Id.  “The 
police in Michigan said Mr. Atchison had been chatting online for two weeks with an undercover 
detective for the Macomb County Sheriff’s Department, who posed as a mother offering to let men 
have sex with her young daughter.  Id.  When she expressed concern that sex could injure the girl, 
according to court documents, Mr. Atchison responded, ‘I’m always gentle and loving; not to 
worry; no damage ever; no rough stuff ever ever.’  He added, ‘I’ve done it plenty.’”).  Id. 
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The fantasies and vulnerabilities engendered by the Internet world 
supplant traditional relationships.275  For many, online attractions are the 
sole source of companionship and fulfillment.276  Those involved in 
Internet flirting are usually incognito, and they masquerade by age, 
appearance, orientation, desire, and fantasy.277  Persons assume extra-
dimensional roles, pretending to be their super alter-egos.278  As a 
comical dog once stated, “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a 
dog.”279 
It is very difficult to decipher truly dangerous predators without 
engaging in orchestrated activity that presses the buttons of criminal 
fantasies.  Once such a person leaves the seductive illusion and visits a 
child to fulfill a fantasy, an overt step has breached into the real world.280  
In United States v. Jacobson,281 for instance, the entrapment claim 
succeeded because the government, through several fictitious 
organizations, persisted for two years to seduce a lonely farmer into the 
joys, protected by the First Amendment, of pornographic magazines 
depicting naked young boys.282  
If less extreme than Jacobson, undercover operations may discover 
who is predisposed to commit child sex crimes.283  It does not matter if the 
decoys are adults, rather than children.284  Legal impossibility is no 
defense.285  Nor can the accused successfully defend his actions on the 
basis of fantasy speech.286  Internet porn incitement statutes require 
sufficient overt steps towards the fulfillment of the crime to separate 
 
 275. See DAVID LEVY, LOVE + SEX WITH ROBOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN- ROBOT 
RELATIONSHIPS 42 (2007).  
 276. See id. (addressing how humans will expand their horizons of love and sex with the 
development of highly sophisticated humanoid robots). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id.   
 280. See Model Penal Code, Section 5.03(5); see also Goodnough, supra note 274, at A8. 
 281. United States v. Jacobson, 503 U.S. 540 (1992) 
 282. Id. at 542-43. 
 283. See, e.g., United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding 
defendant properly convicted of attempting to entice a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity 
through adult undercover operations). 
 284. See id. 
 285. Id.; see also United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 466 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that 
“Congress did not intend to allow the use of an adult decoy, rather than an actual minor, to be 
asserted as a defense to § 2422(b).”); United States v. Weisser, 417 F.3d 336, 352 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(holding that factual impossibility is not a defense to a charge of attempt in substantive criminal 
law). 
 286. See, e.g., Gagliardi, 506 F.3d at 144, 150. 
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intended harm from fantasy.287  The ease of the Internet lures risky sex 
adventures, which implicates First Amendment privacy joys, and teases 
one into action, which implicates Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 
woes.  Fantasies morph into semi-reality.  With a little nudge, the 
government jostles the semi-reality into the overt step of complete reality 
and the macabre world of doom.288 
D. Sting Operations v. Visible Police Presence 
In a celebrated case, Senator Larry Craig, from Idaho, was arrested in 
June 2007 at a Minnesota Airport by a plainclothes police officer 
investigating lewd conduct complaints in a men’s public restroom.289  The 
news reports stated that Senator Craig made homosexual advances in the 
stalls to the undercover officer.290  Senator Craig pled guilty to a 
misdemeanor solicitation,291 but unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw his 
guilty plea based on weak entrapment claims.292  Under intense pressure, 
the Senator announced his retirement after years of public service based on 
this misdemeanor offense and his prior sanctimonious stance against 
homosexuals. 293 
Senator Craig’s entrapment claim presents interesting policy 
perspectives comparing investigative subterfuge against a visible police 
presence in preventing public nuisance crimes. 294  Sting operations are 
frequently used to catch the unwary innocent, as well as the predisposed, in 
prostitution, drugs, and other lascivious crimes.  A traffic officer can hide 
behind a billboard to catch a speeder or openly travel along the highway 
amidst traffic, which encourages safe driving.  The very presence of the 
 
 287. Id.  In Gagliardi, the defendant chose to enter a chat room, labeled “I Love Older Men,” 
contacted the supposed youngster without solicitation, offered to pay for sex, vividly described his 
sexual inclinations, attempted to set up meetings, and visited the designated meeting place with 
condoms and Viagra.  Id.  
 288. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 542-43 (1992). 
 289. Senator, Arrested in an Airport Bathroom, Pleads Guilty, Aug. 28, 2007, N. Y. TIMES, at 
A19. 
 290. Id. (stating that “[t]he officer said Mr. Craig had tapped his foot, in what the officer called 
a known signal to engage in lewd conduct.”). 
 291. Id. 
 292. See Carl Hulse, Senate Ethics Committee Admonishes Craig for His Conduct in Sex Sting 
Arrest, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at A22 (stating, “Senator Larry E. Craig was admonished by his 
colleagues on Wednesday for conduct that reflected poorly on the Senate as the result of his arrest 
and guilty plea last summer in an undercover sex sting in a men’s bathroom at the Minneapolis 
airport.”). 
 293. Id. (stating, “[a]lthough [Senator Craig] initially said he would leave Congress, he decided 
to serve out this term, his third, but will not seek re-election.”). 
 294. See id. 
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officer is an inhibitory factor.  Once the officer leaves the scene, however, 
the drivers return to speeding and the solicitors return to prostitution.  A 
visible police presence is expensive and temporarily halts illegal behavior.  
An undercover operation captures an offender, humiliates him, and 
theoretically deters other wrongdoers long after the undercover operation 
concludes.295 
Sting operations are a periodic purge.296  To purge the sentiment of 
corrupt politicians, the government set up a broad sting operation to 
ensnare United States congressmen.297  The ABSCAM undercover 
investigation corralled several congressmen who were willing to take 
bribes to introduce legislation.298  No particular congressman was targeted 
for investigation; rather, ABSCAM purged those tempted congressmen 
through a standard fencing operation.299  As an occasional purge, especially 
with the lucrative lures of lobbyists, undercover operations successfully 
identify corrupt politicians.  But sting operations are set to capture not just 
the unwary criminal, but the eager innocent as well.300 
VII.  CORRUPTION OF POLICE FORCES 
A. Tulia, Texas: Undercover Investigations Run Amok and Unchecked 
Undercover drug operations have spearheaded a legion of political 
responses: mandatory sentences, three-strike provisions, lucrative forfeiture 
practices, and increased imprisonment of minorities.301  In Tulia, Texas,302 
 
 295. See id. (detailing Senator Craig’s public admonishment by his Senate colleagues). 
 296. See e.g., Andy Newman, Lawmaker Found Guilty of Corruption, N. Y. TIMES, April 9, 
2008, at B1 (stating, “State Assemblywoman Diane M. Gordon of Brooklyn was convicted on 
Tuesday of receiving a bribe for offering to help a developer acquire a parcel of city-owned land 
[through an undercover investigation].”).  The councilwoman’s entrapment defense was 
unsuccessful.  Id. 
 297. See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1461-67 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 298. Id.  The Abscam operation employed a convicted confidence man to spread the word that 
wealthy Arabs were willing to bribe members of Congress to ensure that they would introduce 
private immigration legislation.  See id. at 1462. 
 299. Id. at 1461-67. 
 300. See, e.g., Jamie Reno & Dirk Johnson, ‘These Guys Had To Be Taken Down’: Four 
pounds of Cocaine.  Fifty Pounds of Marijuana.  Inside the San Diego State University Drug Raid, 
NEWSWEEK, May, 19, 2008, at 40 (stating, “[t]he highly organized, widespread drug dealing at a 
university with a solid academic reputation astonished seasoned prosecutors and narcotics officers . 
. . The raid provoked some protest among students who saw it as overly aggressive.”). 
 301. See BLAKESLEE, supra note 11, at 80 (stating, “the growth of the task force system 
coincided with a massive acceleration in prison construction in the state [of Texas] . . . [T]he state more 
than tripled its prison capacity—from 40,000 to 150,000 beds—in just ten years.  Texas [in 2007] has 
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for instance, one undercover agent worked for eighteen months, during 
which time he netted forty-seven drug dealers, approximately thirteen 
percent of the adult, black male population.303  Sentences for small or 
repeat offenses ranged from five to 361 years.304  Several of those 
convicted were former high school football stars, with no prior record, 
convicted for selling small amounts of cocaine and sentenced to mandatory 
20 years.305  One 60-year-old so-called “drug kingpin,” who had prior 
convictions of small drug offenses, lived in a shack and was sentenced to 
ninety years for allegedly selling a single eight ball of cocaine.306  Belated 
habeas evidentiary hearings revealed that much of the drugs were diluted 
eight balls mixed by the undercover officer.307 
Unknown to the defendants, the undercover officer faced theft 
charges from another county and was in serious debt.308  The undercover 
 
more inmates than California, even though Texas has forty percent fewer people.  Only Louisiana 
and Mississippi incarcerate a greater percentage of their populations than Texas.”). 
 302. Tulia, Texas is located in the panhandle, a farming and ranching community of five 
thousand people.  Id. at pictures following page 230.  In the summer of 1999, authorities in Tulia, 
Texas conducted a massive raid over the town after an undercover operation spearheaded by a police 
officer, Tom Coleman.  Id. at 10-11. 
 303. Id. at 4, 18.  Coleman was named officer of the year following the busts in Tulia.  
Attorney General John Cornyn presented the award to Coleman.  Id. at 4, pictures following page 
230.  John Cornyn is now a U.S. Senator.  Id. 
 304. See id. at 381, 409-17, Joe Moore, a so-called “drug kingpin,” who lived in a shack, was 
sentenced to ninety years for allegedly selling a single eight ball of cocaine to Tom Coleman.  Id. at 
pictures following page 230.  Moore’s trial lasted seven hours.  Id.  Belated habeas corpus petitions 
filed by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, A.C.L.U., and private attorneys offering pro bono assistance 
discovered that the local prosecution offices and the courts suppressed evidence revealing the undercover 
officer’s lies.  Id. at 241-43.  Coleman had no experience in undercover narcotics operations prior to 
coming to Tulia.  Id. at 4.  He had been fired or quit two prior deputy positions.  Id. at 4-5.  He also had a 
series of unpaid debts.  Id. at 98. 
 305. Id. at pictures following page 230, 411, 415 (stating, “Freddie Brookins Jr. was the 
starting tailback for Tulia High’s football team in the mid-1990’s.  Though he had no prior offenses, 
he was given the maximum sentence of twenty years for allegedly selling an eight ball (less than 3.5 
grams) of cocaine to undercover agent Tom Coleman . . . Donnie Smith was named Tulia High’s 
male athlete of the year in 1988.  He was sentenced to twelve and a half years in the Coleman sting.  
Three of his siblings were also indicted.”). 
 306. Id. at pictures following page 230. 
 307. Id. at 292. 
 308. Id. at 98-99.  After a lengthy habeas evidentiary hearing, a settlement agreement was 
reached.  Both sides stipulated that Tom Coleman was a false witness and every single conviction 
would be vacated.  Id. at 386.  Tom Coleman was subsequently convicted of perjury.  Id. at 371, 
386-87.  The Judge stated that “Tom Coleman is the most devious, nonresponsive law enforcement 
witness that this court has encountered in twenty-five years on the bench.”  Id. at 387.  Prosecutor 
Terry McEachern’s bar license was suspended.  See Jennifer Emily and Steve McGonigle, Dallas 
County District Attorney Wants Unethical Prosecutors Punished, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 4, 
2008 (noting that “[i]n 2005, the bar gave the former district attorney of Hale and Swisher counties, 
Terry McEachern, a two-year probated suspension of his law license for hiding evidence at trial in 
41
Carter: To Catch the Lion, Tether the Goat
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
09-CARTER.DOC 1/29/2009  3:33:20 PM 
176 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:135 
officer was ill-tempered,309 suffered mental problems,310 and was a 
suspected racist.311  The habeas hearings revealed that the prosecutor and 
trial judge suppressed evidence of the undercover officer’s background.312  
The undercover officer kept few reports by scrawling information on his 
leg and based his testimony of 18 months of investigation on memory. 313 
The criminal justice system in Tulia, Texas, like the criminal justice 
system throughout the country, ignored the detention of the town’s Black 
male residents for trivial and questionable drug offenses.314  The prosecutor 
charged small amounts of drugs before all white juries, comparing trace 
amounts of drugs to a rattlesnake: “It doesn’t matter if it’s a little 
rattlesnake or a big rattlesnake; if a rattlesnake bites you, it’s going to kill 
you.”315 
 
the discredited Tulia drug bust.”), available at http://www.november.org/stayinfo/breaking08/TX-
Unethical.html. 
 309. See BLAKESLEE, supra note 11,  at 330.  The belated habeas hearings discovered that one of 
the Texas Rangers reported that the undercover officer needed constant supervision and had a bad 
temper.  Id. at 305. 
 310. Id. at 329-30. 
 311. Id. at 332-33.  In a deposition, Sheriff Amos admitted that he “personally disciplined 
Coleman for using the word ‘nigger’ around the office, and that he had attempted to get Coleman to 
make some buys outside of the black community when it became apparent that his operation was 
almost entirely focused on black suspects.”  Id. at 332. 
 312. Id. at 14.  In habeas corpus proceedings, the evidence revealed that the Swisher County 
prosecutor, Terry McEachern, withheld information about Coleman – such as Coleman’s pending 
criminal indictment from another county.  Id. at 14.  Judge Ed Self made a statement to the Amarillo 
Globe News after the case was remanded to him by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, “[The 
Texas voters are] partly tired of all the talk about the drug bust.  I think it’s also that the voters in 
Swisher County believe their officials do their jobs properly and act within the law.”  Id. at 290.  In 
response to the defense motion to disqualify Judge Self for bias, the Judge recused himself.  Id. at 
291.  During discovery proceedings, the Sheriff admitted that Tom Coleman was a “bad apple,” yet they 
turned him loose in Tulia anyway.  Id. at 332. 
 313. Id. at 46.  The trial judge, Ed Self, refused to allow evidence impugning the credibility of 
the prosecutor, Terry McEachern, and informant, Tom Coleman, who allegedly used money and 
falsified drug reports to the tune of $7,000.  Id. at 120.  The bottom line was that with no 
corroboration, only Tom Coleman could say which of the cases were real, and which cases were 
fabricated.  Id. at 296. 
 314. Id. at 404.  Black residents and White residents, such as Gary Gardner, Alan Bean, and 
Thelma Johnson, organized the Friends of Justice, seeking to bring media attention to the busts in 
Tulia.  Id.  Their protests made them targets of local scorn.  Fred Brookins, Sr., a manager at a meat-
packing plant, became a leader of the protest movement.  Id. at pictures following page 230, 404.  
On October 7, the Tulia story appeared on the Front Page of the New York Times and Los Angeles 
Times.  Id. at 182.  A feature segment on CNN soon followed.  Id.  On 20/20 program, a room full 
of jurors indicated that they had no second thoughts about their verdicts, even when told of 
Coleman’s background.  Id. 
 315. Id. at 119.  Police corruption and abuse is common throughout the country.  See e.g., Susan 
Saulny, Chicago Police Abuse Cases Exceed Average, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at A24.  The article 
provides that  
Chicago police officers are the subject of more brutality complaints per officer than the 
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The willingness of several pro bono attorneys, attorneys from the 
NAACP Legal Defense fund, attorneys from the American Civil Liberties 
Union, the keen investigative reporting of several news agencies, and 60 
Minutes televised news shows finally prompted the legislature, the 
Governor, and the courts to act.316  
There are many stories across the nation where undercover drug 
agents fabricate evidence or engage in illegal practices.  In New Jersey, a 
former undercover narcotics investigator was convicted in 2000 of running 
a brothel and selling protection to drug dealers.317  In Tucson, Arizona, a 
narcotics agent and his wife were indicted for embezzling $615,000 over a 
four year period.318  In central Missouri, thirty convictions were reversed 
after a task force undercover narcotics officer was indicted in 2003 for 
perjury.319  In April of 2001, several civil rights cases were filed against the 
Texas town of Hearne after a task force snitch admitted fabricating 
evidence.320 
Many state undercover drug operations throughout the country are 
funded by grants from the U.S. Department of Justice.321  Nationwide, 
there are over 750 Byrne task forces in rural areas, employing 
approximately 5,000 to 7,000 narcotics agents.322  The narcotics task forces 
employ undercover agents, who solicit drugs with large amounts of cash.323  
 
national average, and the Police Department is far less likely to pursue abuse cases 
seriously than the national norm’, a legal team at the University of Chicago reported 
Wednesday.  The report [is] ‘The Chicago Police Department’s Broken System.’ . . .  
According to the new report, rogue police officers abuse victims without fear of 
punishment, and the lack of accountability has tainted the entire department . . . . 
Patterns of abuse and disciplinary neglect were worst in low-income minority 
neighborhoods, said the authors, Craig B. Futterman, H. Melissa Mather, and Melanie 
Miles. 
Id. 
 316. BLAKESLEE, supra note 11, at 241-43, 420. 
 317. Id. at 201. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 401. 
 321. Id. at 201-02.  One example is the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law 
Enforcement Assistance Grant.  Id.  The grant funds drug task forces in mostly rural and suburban areas 
across the country.  The program was named in memory of Edward Byrne, a New York City police 
officer shot dead by drug dealers in 1988.  Id.  
 322. Id. at 204.  The Byrne Grant provided federal money; the manpower came from local 
police forces, county sheriffs, and district attorney’s offices, which combined with neighboring 
counties to form new drug outfits.  Id. at 203.  The money was distributed to the states by the 
Department of Justice’s main grant-making arm, the Bureau of Justice Assistance.  Id. 
 323. Id. at 206.  Republican State Representative Terry Keel stated the problem with the 
heavily funded task force operations, 
[t]he officers in the narcotics task forces do not have a chain of command that watches 
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Many states rewrote their respective asset forfeiture laws to allow greater 
percentages of assets seized during drug busts to be funneled to law 
enforcement agency budgets.324  The lucrative drug trade incites police 
corruption throughout the nation.325  There are rogue officers, missing 
drugs, stolen cash, fabricated cases, failed drug tests, and profitable 
financial arrangements in every county.326  Many undercover agents have 
psychological problems.327  
Defendants filed civil rights actions against the cities and counties, 
funded by the federal grant, for the unmonitored investigations and 
discovery violations, which imprisoned hundreds of men and left fatherless 
hundreds of children.328 
 
them carefully . . . They are left undercover and loosely supervised in some cases.  They 
have unbridled discretion often on their interdiction decisions, and they deal with large 
amounts of cash . . . Now all of that is a formula for disaster. 
Id. 
 324. Id.  Other tasks force included the state’s famous scandal involving the Permian Basin 
Drug Task Force, setting for Friday Night Lights, the classic account of Texas high school football, 
id.; a major police scandal occurred in Dallas in 2001 where a pair of undercover narcotics agents 
“set up bogus cocaine busts in order to cash in on huge informant’s fees.”  Id. at 261.  “[H]alf of all 
the cocaine seized in Dallas in 2001 was actually powdered gypsum, better known as Sheetrock.”  
Id. 
 325. See David Heinszmann, Bar Tape Refutes Cops: Video of ‘04 Raid Casts New Doubts On 
City’s Elite Police Unit, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 2007, at 1.  The city of Chicago is infamous for its 
police corruption, even of its elite police units.  Id.   
The video contradicts the arresting officer’s version of what happened that night, but it 
also raises constitutional issues about whether officers improperly searched dozens of 
people.  The video also adds to a list of questions about [Special Operating Section] 
officers’ conduct, which is the focus of state and federal investigations. 
Id. 
 326. BLAKESLEE, supra note 11, at 207; Drugs saturate the entire jurisprudential system with 
corruption.  See, e.g., Azam Ahmed & Jason Meisner,  Prosecutor Charged with Drug Possession: Cook 
County Official was on Unpaid Leave, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 2008, at 5 (stating, “Cook County prosecutor 
Chad Sabora hung his head as an assistant state’s attorney detailed the evidence against him Thursday at 
a bail hearing . . . Sabora was found ingesting a white powder substance believed to be heroin and 
possessing five tin-foil packets of suspected heroin Wednesday night while in his vehicle, police reports 
said.”). 
 327. See BLAKESLEE, supra note 11, at 212.  Texas criminal defense attorney Ed Lieck stated, 
“[m]ore numbers means more money.  I’ve been doing this for ten years, and law enforcement is 
about money . . . Anybody who tells you different is lying to you.”  Id. 
 328. Id. at 402-04.  Many communities have tried reconciliation tactics and routine community 
meetings with the police.  See, e.g., Christine Hauser, A Precinct’s Hard Road Back, N. Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 24, 2008. at A27.  Very frequently, the hostilities engendered on both sides are not resolved by 
community reconciliation.  Id.   
Even though the detectives on trial this week – two on manslaughter charges and one on 
reckless endangerment charges – were part of an undercover unit . . . the precinct’s 
officers had to deal with protest marches and frustration . . . . The clergy, the police and 
the N.A.A.C.P. worked together after the Bell shooting to keep things calm, organizing 
youth gatherings and town hall meetings. 
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B. Civil Rights Remedies to Unmonitored Investigations 
The actions of unmonitored undercover agents who falsify charges 
instigate civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983.329  The idea that cities 
and counties could be liable for misdeeds of undercover agents simply by 
virtue of being a member of a regional task force set an alarming precedent 
that rippled through the states.330  Many of the civil rights cases were 
settled for millions of dollars and the disbanding of the federal task 
forces.331 
Prosecutors are held liable for failing to adequately train and 
supervise undercover agents,332 and for the administrative functions 
concerning sharing of information of informants and promises made to 
informants.333  Personnel decisions concerning undercover agents are 
administrative functions.334  Prosecutors are not given immunity for 
conspiring to fabricate evidence.335  The undercover agent in the Tulia case 
 
Id. 
However, such community events did not stop Police Officer Edward Byrne, 22, from being killed 
while the officer was guarding the home of a witness.  Id. 
 329. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows citizens to bring suit against a “person who, under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”  Id.  The Civil Rights lawsuit named every one of 
the cities involved in the regional Narcotics Task Force.  BLAKESLEE, supra note 11, at 399.  As a 
condition of settling the lawsuit, the city of Amarillo agreed to cease participation in the task force.  
The city of Amarillo led off the settlement with $5 million and the disbanding of the task force.  Id. 
at 400. 
 330. See id. at 403.  In the lawsuit in Hearne, Texas, a federal judge ruled that all political 
entities in a task force were at least potentially liable for malfeasance committed by its agents, 
regardless of where the acts in question occurred.  Id. 
 331. Id. at 403-04. 
 332. See, e.g., Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that prosecutor is not immune from civil rights charges which allege incompetence for the 
administrative functions of the office), cert. granted, Van De Kamp v. Goldstein, (14 Apr. 14, 2008) 
(No 07-854); See also Rachel Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: 
Lessons from Administrative Law (Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 08-10, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114172 (addressing viable 
administrative corrective approaches on prosecutorial overreaching to curb prosecutor’s enormous 
power). 
 333. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (concerning prosecutor’s obligation to 
train and supervise informants and inform parties of promises). 
 334. See, e.g., Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
personnel decisions are administrative not prosecutorial, regardless of whether it would remove a 
prosecutor from future case), rev’d on other grounds, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 
478, 492, 496 (1991) (holding that the provision of legal advice to police investigators is not a 
prosecutorial activity).  
 335. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 272, 278 (1993); see also Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 
1023, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that prosecutors do not have absolute immunity when they 
withhold exculpatory evidence before probable cause exists to arrest a defendant); see also Maurice 
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was indicted and convicted of perjury charges.336  The prosecutor was 
sanctioned.337  In remedial fashion, the Texas legislature passed statutes 
granting bond to several defendants imprisoned.338  Governor Rick Perry 
pardoned all of the defendants convicted in the Tulia drug sting.339 
1.  The Fair Defense Act of 2001 
The Texas legislature passed the Fair Defense Act of 2001,340 which 
opened the files of police officers in bad standing.341  The Act raised the 
standards for undercover narcotics operations by requiring that evidence 
elicited by confidential informants be corroborated, by audio or video, or 
other means.342  The Act revised the entire attorney appointment process, 
requiring attorneys for the indigent within four to six days of arrest.343  The 
greatest attribute of this act is the appointment of attorneys at the very early 
stages of arrest who will address the probable cause determinations and 
false claims.344 
2.  The Fallacy of Reconciliation Committees 
Similar to the South African Reconciliation laws addressing the 
historical culture of police corruption, a “reconciliation committee” was 
 
Possley, Ruling Could Put Prosecutor On Trial: Anthony Harris’ Murder Confession was Coerced and 
Inaccurate.  He’s Suing Official Who Used it Against Him,” CHI. TRIB., May 15, 2008, at 5 (insert 
entitled “Immunity Limits”) (providing, “Immunity Limits: In federal civil rights lawsuits, prosecutors 
are entitled to two kinds of immunity: absolute immunity and qualified immunity.  When prosecutors act 
as advocates, they have absolute immunity from damages.  If prosecutors act as investigators or 
administrators, they have immunity unless they engage in misconduct that violates the law.”). 
 336. BLAKESLEE, supra note 11, at 389, 407-08.  Tom Coleman was found guilty of perjury in 
January 2005.  Id. 
 337. See Jennifer Emily & Steve McGonigle, Dallas County District Attorney Wants Unethical 
Prosecutors Punished, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 4, 2008 (noting, “[i]n 2005, the bar gave the 
former district attorney of Hale and Swisher counties, Terry McEachern, a two-year probated 
suspension of his law license for hiding evidence at trial in the discredited Tulia drug bust.”). 
 338. BLAKESLEE, supra note 11, at 390, 399. 
 339. Id. at 399. 
 340. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 15.16-15.17. 
 341. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 15.16-15.17; see also website on Tulia, Texas and the 
justice system, http://www.hr95.org/tulia.htm. 
 342. BLAKESLEE, supra note 11, at 401-02.  The task force system was also amended to place 
them under the auspices of the state police, and Department of Public Safety, which discovered that 
many of the task forces were in disarray.  Id. at 401-03.  The Department of Public Safety crafted new 
rules for the task forces concerning the control of evidence and record keeping, and tightening 
procedures for forfeiture proceedings, which had accumulated hoards of money.  Id. 
 343. Id. at 402.  The Fair Defense Act of 2001 also provided for an impartial method for 
assigning cases to attorneys, set minimum qualifications, and higher compensation rates.  Id. 
 344. Id. 
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formed in Tulia, though unsuccessfully, after the release of the defendants 
to give the community and the new police personnel a chance to open a 
dialogue.345  Successful reconciliation efforts typically include a process of 
accountability, an opportunity for the citizens to be heard, forthright 
compensation,346 and a historical accounting of the events.347  The 
community in Tulia and other communities around the nation suffer 
significantly for a mass class of wrongful incarcerations.  Besides 
substantial economic losses and loss of familial consortium, there is the 
“loss of society” and the impact to their community roles.348  The 
reconciliation efforts failed to provide community standing on the pivotal 
policy issues which implemented a massive undercover operation in the 
first place.  The police were only doing the bidding of the policy makers, 
which dictated a political course of action directed against minorities 
caught in the throes of a wayward drug policy.349  In short, reconciliation 
committees fail to reach the chief policy makers.350 
An English study regarding public confidence in the police noted that 
trust and confidence are not necessarily shaped by the sentiments about risk 
and crime, but by evaluations of the values and morals that underpin 
community life.351  The police must not replicate criminal behavior in the 
name of the “law.”352  The maintenance of peace and harmony in a 
neighborhood can be as effectively achieved by a benign gang as by the 
police.353  Citizens complain that “racial profiling, police corruption and 
the excesses of the war on drugs have made them suspicious of virtually 
any arm of the government.”354  Viable reconciliation committees 
require standing to address policy questions fomented by administrators 
and government personnel. 
 
 345. BLAKESLEE, supra note 11, at 404; see, e.g., Penelope E. Andrews, Reparations for 
Apartheid’s Victims: The Path to Reconciliation?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1155, 1171-80 (2004) (addressing 
standards and problems regarding South Africa’s Reconciliation committee). 
 346. See, e.g., Joellen Lind, Valuing Relationships: The Role of Damages for Loss of Society, 
35 N.M. L. REV. 301, 302 (2005) (discussing “loss of society” as a bona fide claim for relief).  Loss 
of society damages allow the law of torts to reflect the impact to the community of injuries to the 
social roles and third parties.  Id. 
 347. Andrews, supra note 345, at 1158. 
 348. Lind, supra note 346, at 302. 
 349. Id. 
 350. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 345, at 1178-79. 
 351. See Jonathan Jackson & Jason Sunshine, Public Confidence in Policing, 47 Brit. J. 
Criminology 214, 230 (2007). 
 352. Id. 
 353. See David Kocieniewski, So Many Crimes, and Reasons to Not Cooperate, N. Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 30, 2007, at 19. 
 354. Id. 
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C. Standards Posed for Undercover Operations 
There are several brands of undercover investigations: sting 
operations; long protracted investigations; passive operations; rogue task 
force; and the use of confidential informants.355  Several police agencies 
have established guidelines for undercover operations.356  Standards culled 
from points raised in this Article include:  
1. The police must seek prosecutorial approval before an undercover 
operation, which invades all manners of privacy, speech, association 
and self-incrimination protections.357 
2. The objectives of the investigation must be articulated.  The 
undercover operation must identify the target of the operation and 
substantiate the target’s importance.358  
3. The undercover agent must undergo a psychological profile and 
testing.  The agent must receive psychological review during a 
protracted assignment.  Playing dual roles and engaging in anti-social 
behavior requires psychological strength and stamina.  As one literary 
investigator stated when the political climate changed in favor with 
Columbia, “all this time I thought I was a cop pretending to be a drug 
dealer, when all the time I was a drug dealer pretending to be a cop.”359 
4. The investigating officer must take clear, unequivocal notes of each 
transaction and record the matter. 
5. Undercover agents must avoid sexual deception and involvement 
during the investigation.360 
6. In protracted investigations, the role of the agent or informant must 
be systematically monitored and reviewed.361  Occasionally, 
 
 355. See The Attorney General’s Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover 
Operations at 2-8, http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf. (discussing the standards for 
undercover investigations). 
 356. See generally DENNIS FITZGERALD, INFORMANTS AND UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LAW, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE (2007) (discussing guidelines of operations 
by the U.S. Attorney, F.B.I., and I.R.S regarding types of informants and their motivations). 
 357. See on a comparative basis, First Plainclothes Police Station in China, 
http://www.China.org.ch/government/local.governments/2007-11/02/content_1230607.htm. 
 358. See e.g., Rhode Island Department of Attorney General Rules and Regulations for 
Reverse Undercover/Proprietary Operations, http://www.rules.state.ri.us/rules/released/pdf/AG/ 
4383.pdf (1999); see, e.g., Reno & Johnson, supra note 301, at 40 (stating, “[t]he raid, which 
included crackdowns on several fraternities, came a year to the day after the overdose death of 
Jenny Poliakoff, a 19-year-old student at San Diego State.  It was the tragedy that triggered the 
undercover drug operation.”).   
 359. This quotation is uttered by Lawrence Fishburne’s character in the film Deep Cover 
(News Line Productions 1992). 
 360. See generally Gary T. Marx, Under-The-Covers Undercover Investigations: Some 
Reflections on the State’s Use of Sex and Deception in Law Enforcement, 11 Crim. J. Ethics 13 
(1992). 
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undercover agents become ringleaders of the very group they are 
monitoring.362  If the objectives change in light of new circumstances, 
then the operation must be reviewed. 
7. There should be time limitations to the investigations.363 
8. When an undercover employee learns that persons under 
investigation intend to commit a violent crime, he or she shall try to 
discourage the violence. 
9. If the agent participates in crimes and induces others to commit 
crimes in order to fulfill a higher objective, what is called derivative 
entrapment, then the deliberative influences must be articulated in 
discovery to the defense and all third persons, who are affected by the 
agent’s participation.364 
10.  The agent’s participation and conspiratorial encouragement of 
crimes must be a factor weighted in the accused’s sentence.365 
11.  A pretrial hearing to establish the contours of the investigation 
must be available to the defense. 
12.  All inducements, promises, and considerations made to the 
undercover informant or confidential informant must be disclosed to 
the defense. 
There are many standards profiled in various police agencies, attorney 
general offices, and the F.B.I.  The failure to adopt undercover 
investigation standards is grounds for a civil rights action. 
 
 361. See, e.g., Michel Girodo, Ph.D., Drug Corruption in Undercover Agents: Measuring the 
Risk, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L., 361, 361 (1991) (noting, “[d]rug corruption is more likely among law 
enforcement officers who use undercover investigative methods.  Current views of police corruption 
attribute drug corruption either to flaws in character or to the corrupting criminal environment 
where investigations are carried out.”). 
 362. See GARY MAY, THE INFORMANT: THE F.B.I., THE KU KLUX KLAN, AND THE MURDER OF 
VIOLA LIUZZO IX (2005) (recounting the murder of Detroit citizen Viola Liuzzo by the K.K.K., 
wherein an undercover informant assisted in her murder in Selma, Alabama).  F.B.I. informant Gary 
Thomas Rowe was an informant from 1960-1965 and was present when Ms. Liuzzo was shot.  Id.  
Rowe was involved in a number of murders during the civil rights movement.  Id.  To protect 
Rowe’s true identity, the F.B.I. allowed Rowe to attack Blacks and Freedom Riders without fear of 
arrest or prosecution.  Id. 
 363. The Attorney General Report requires an investigation of 6 months and no longer than one 
year.  See The Attorney General’s Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover 
Operations (Attorney General’s Guidelines), http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf.  
 364. See, e.g., United States v. Pilarinos, 864 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1988) (recognizing the 
principles of derivative entrapment, where third persons are affected by undercover agents 
influence). 
 365. “The undercover employee shall be instructed in the law of entrapment.”  Attorney 
General’s Guidelines, supra note 363, at 17.  
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VII.  SUMMARY 
Entrapment succeeds through conspiracy, and conspiracy breeds 
manipulative influences.  Entrapment is a defense against mandatory 
sentences, against exploitive enhancement statutes, and against excessive 
police inducements.366  Manipulation is a common fact of life.  Public 
relations, advertisements, media sound-bites, socialization, and even tax 
laws induce societal behavior.  Aggravating criminal behavior through 
manipulative means, however, imperils a government’s equitable standing.  
The entrapment defense compares whose hands are dirtiest: the 
predisposed suspect or the predetermined government, which feeds from 
the coffers of crime.  Lucrative forfeiture practices and incarceration of 
large minority groups feed the conspiratorial paranoia.367 
Undercover operations are lies that tell the truth.  But the truth 
frequently presents conflicting policy objectives.  Through the criminal 
processes in the drug wars, as in Tulia, Texas, the most desperate citizens 
are demonized, isolated, incarcerated, and denied a role in the American 
dream.368  In truth, undercover operations in the drug effort have acted as a 
venal war on the underclass.  Yet, corporations bent on fraud and bribery 
are free-spirited with deferred prosecutions.369  Crime is a capital 
investment and the government is the major stockholder. 
Undercover investigations intrude on our Bill of Rights, our freedom 
of association, of speech, of fantasies.  Yet, such investigations are 
necessary as solid, empirical proof of present and future dangerousness.  
As with Beelzebub, the characters of good and evil become 
indistinguishable.  When the government feeds at the trough of criminality, 
then the government has breached its social contract with its citizens and 
lost its moral imperative.370 
 
 
 366. See Attorney General’s Guidelines, supra note 363, at 2-16. 
 367. “Just because you’re paranoid, doesn’t mean they’re not out to get you.” Quote from 
unknown source available at http://www.rpi.edu/~markhn/quotes.html. 
 368. See generally BLAKESLEE, supra note 11. 
 369. See Eric Lichtblau, In Justice Shift, Corporate Deals Replace Trials, N.Y. TIMES April 9, 
2008, at A1.  The companies are legion: Monsanto on bribing millions of dollars with Indonesian 
officials, American Express, mortgage companies, and the sub-prime mortgage debacle.  Id. 
 370. See generally MAURICE PUNCH, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
POLICE DEVIANCE AND CONTROL 1-7 (1985).  Police deviance elicits a special feeling of betrayal.  
Something extra is involved when public officials and policemen in particular deviate from accepted 
norms.  That something more is the violation of a fiduciary relationship, the corruption of a public 
trust and public virtue.  Id. 
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